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Abstract 
Government involvement in New Zealand sport spans over 70 years 
from provisions of the Physical Welfare Act in 1937 to current provisions of 
the Sport and Recreation Act 2002. Thousands of volunteers in non-profit 
organisations continue to underpin New Zealand‟s sport system. It is 
axiomatic that sport defines part of what it means to be a New Zealander. 
Governments frequently use the rhetoric of community cohesion, national 
pride, life skills and public health benefits to justify its involvement. This thesis 
examines the impact of government intervention on the sport sector, its 
funding paradigms and the extent of sector engagement in a policy for sport. 
Through an examination of available government and sport sector 
records, and the author‟s own experience as a participant in events, the thesis 
recounts a sequence of five milestones for the New Zealand sport system and 
views them through a public management system lens. The passing of the 
Physical Welfare and Recreation Act in 1937, the establishment of a Ministry 
and Council for Recreation and Sport in 1973, the ministerial Sports 
Development Inquiry in 1984, the Prime Minister‟s Review of High 
Performance Sport in 1995 and the Sport, Fitness and Leisure Ministerial 
Taskforce. Government funding of sport now stands at around $100 million 
annually from small beginnings of $3,295 in 1945/1946, despite the absence 
of a comprehensive national policy for sport. 
By examining the chronology through a wider state sector lens, the 
thesis opens a window to the practical effect of public policy processes on 
 iii 
matters of importance to the New Zealand sport sector and its voluntary 
sector foundations. 
This thesis also provides a rationale for revitalising the engagement 
between government and the New Zealand sport sector to meet the 
expectations of a modern state sector to meaningfully engage citizens and the 
non-government sector in the formation of policy and planning its 
implementation. 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
Partnership suggests a personal relationship in which each partner 
knows who they are dealing with. The state, however, is impersonal 
and owes its very existence to assuming burdens and tasks that 
individuals cannot, and would not, assume for themselves. Caution 
should be exercised when partnering with the state. (Runciman, 2003, 
12) 
My involvement in the New Zealand recreation and sport sector started 
in the early 1970s, as a volunteer coach, a volunteer administrator at local 
and national levels, a paid administrator and an unpaid board member. Over 
the years, my involvement included national and international activity, much of 
it still as a volunteer. Governments‟ funding for sport never seemed enough, 
strategies appeared as an imposition „from the top down‟, and many sport 
leader colleagues felt left out, without a say in the national sport system which 
so deeply affected their sports. I was, with others, a trenchant critic of the 
government‟s involvement in the sport sector. The phrase, “If I had my way…” 
started many conversations with colleagues in the sport sector about our 
views on improving government funding of sport. As sport administrators, we 
rarely examined our understanding of government policy. Our involvement in 
government-led processes only addressed the narrow concerns of our 
organisations. We had little sense of government structures, public sector 
financial accountability requirements. We remained ignorant of the impact of 
major economic and public sector reforms during the 1980s and 1990s.  
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Public discourse about government involvement in New Zealand sport 
seems to replicate similar commentary to that in other western countries. 
Sport participation in New Zealand is a matter of private choice as in these 
countries. New Zealand‟s national sport system comprises community-based 
sport organisations delivering services and benefits to members, and relying 
on volunteers for their administration and survival. The development of the 
state‟s funding policies for sport, however, often bypass meaningful 
engagement with the sport sector. As a result, sport administrators and 
government officials are frequently ill-informed about each other‟s worlds and 
experiences. 
Modern governments in western democracies now seek to strengthen 
the legitimacy of public policy by providing citizens with access to the policy 
process. This goes beyond merely informing the public. Instead, governments 
adopt more deliberative techniques such as focus groups to build a 
consensus on a particular policy proposal (Althaus, Bridgman & Davis, 2007, 
100). While New Zealand has been slow to adopt deliberative democracy, 
Hughes and Calder (2007, 55) cite Chen‟s observation in 1997, that recent 
legislation in the 1990s contained 373 references to “consultation”. Hughes 
and Calder also comment that “a good consultation process will increase the 
likelihood of a policy being understood. It allows for stakeholders to „buy in‟ to 
aims and support the policy, or suggest changes if necessary” (p. 55). 
There are no universal answers to when governments should use more 
or less deliberative practice when developing policy. A sport policy for New 
Zealand, however, requires the support and participation of the non-
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government organisations (NGOs) which administer sporting codes.1 Their 
ownership of rules, development and training of coaches, referees and 
administrators provide a direct ownership interest in their codes. They are the 
organisations to whom citizens turn for access to sport and, even when a 
private sector provider is involved, the sports‟ national bodies retain an 
oversight of sport provision. Governments engage with NGOs generally and 
the sport sector particularly, in many ways. This engagement represents an 
important component of modern democracies in the 21st century. In this 
context, the study examines: 
 the chronology of government‟s involvement in the New Zealand 
sport sector from 1937-2002 
 the extent to which government sport reviews sought common 
ground and consensus across the sport sector and between 
government and the sector on how to proceed 
 government‟s policy development processes as they relate to 
sport and in particular, the challenges inherent to seeking out 
and nurturing a voice for sport to speak in those processes 
 the chain of delegation extending from ministers to the 
government sport funding agencies which leads to interactions 
between government funders and sport NGOs. 
 
1
 The term non-government organisation or NGO is an internationally accepted term for 
community-based non-profit organisations. In New Zealand, the sector from which these 
organisations come is also termed variously as community and voluntary, non-profit, not-for-
profit, voluntary or third sector. This study uses the term NGO. 
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The study also provides signposts to a different way of working and to the 
goal of achieving a consensual policy between government and the sport 
sector. 
The literature on the interface between sport and government in 
western democracies such as New Zealand on public policy pays little 
attention to the NGO foundations of sport. Many New Zealand commentators 
point to the benefits of involving NGOs in the development of public policy 
areas relating to service delivery such as health and social services (Ministry 
of Social Development, 2001, 51; Kelsey, 1997, 292; Boston et al, 1999, 104). 
Kelly (2007, 1010) summarises the benefit to government of NGO 
participation in public policy in three main categories: resources, procedures 
and organisation. When applied to sport, these categories reveal potential 
advantages of government engaging with sport NGOs. 
Resources and knowledge – NGOs have a deep knowledge of and 
ability to advocate for their members needs and expectations. The NGO 
networks provide government with access to ready-made expertise which 
may be recruited to assist in policy development and to monitor the efficacy of 
government‟s actions. 
Procedures – The sport NGOs are strong contributors to social capital 
and social cohesion. They represent coalitions of interest which in New 
Zealand, involve 400,000 or 48% of all volunteers (Sport and Recreation New 
Zealand, 2006a, 2).  
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Independence – By focusing on meeting the needs of members, sport 
NGOs tailor their services to member needs in ways that the state can never 
do. 
Between 1979 and 2002, a range of national level sport sector 
organisations placed their trust in me, electing me to their boards some of 
which I eventually chaired. These organisations included Coaching New 
Zealand, Sport Science New Zealand and the Sport, Fitness and Recreation 
Industry Training Organisation. Each of these umbrella bodies held mandates 
to deliver services to the sport sector and to speak for their particular 
segments of the sport industry. 
Once in these governance positions, I quickly learned that beyond my 
interest in specific aspects of sport (education and training, coaching and 
sport science) came a responsibility to speak for the stakeholders who elected 
me and to ensure that what I had to say represented their collective views and 
the interests of the organisation as a whole. Finally, I became chief executive 
of a national sport organisation, experiencing first hand the demands of 
managing a sporting code, dealing with financial management pressures and 
particularly, the demands of working directly with the government‟s sport 
funding agency. 
Then I became a senior government official within the sport portfolio 
and subsequently in the wider social development portfolio. In the latter role I 
carried a specialist focus on the community and voluntary sector. While a new 
understanding of public policy helped my understanding of how and why 
government funded the voluntary sector generally, the lack of robust public 
 6 
policy process applied to the sport sector was striking. Over time, I also 
observed a shift in government perspectives on accountability for public 
sector performance from a focus on measuring outputs or activities to the 
effects of government activities or outcomes.  
Making outcomes central to planning requires public servants to more 
clearly describe and monitor the chain of events which lead from an initial 
activity to a set of results which provide plausible evidence that government‟s 
goals have been achieved. The pressure for greater levels of accountability 
from the recipients of public funding, however, often runs counter to an 
„outcomes focus‟. Government now seeks to connect the use of taxpayer 
funds to policy goals and measurable results (Scott, 2001, 154; McGhee, 
2005, 453-463). Public sector agencies find themselves managing a tension 
between managing their activities to ensure government policies happen as 
planned and ensuring they have enough information to withstand any critique 
of taxpayer money expenditure. Ryan, (2004) sums up this requirement: 
Accountability for outcomes does not mean that managers or analysts 
must be liable for outcomes at government or even policy levels. It 
does mean that they should be accountable for „managing for 
outcomes‟; that they do everything expected of them in proactively 
trying to make government policy happen as intended and for the 
quality of their work in doing so. (p. viii) 
Government places a high value on strategic alliances and emphasises 
networks and strong relationships with non-government actors, particularly 
those in the voluntary sector (Ministry of Social Development, 2001, 61; 
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Wevers, 2008). The language of partnership and collaboration threads its way 
through many public management system guidance documents (Atkinson, 
2007, 12). Ministers express these ideas publicly and privately; and across 
the state sector, public agencies engage voluntary sector stakeholders in 
deeper and more robust participatory processes. Governments seek out 
„voices‟ for each sector, often expecting a single coherent point of contact. A 
unified „voice for sport‟, however, does not exist.  
The events described in this study refer specifically to the realm of 
sport. However, over the period this study covers, sport fell into a range of 
wider terms such as leisure and physical recreation. The study does not 
address these broader domains instead focusing exclusively on the sport 
sector and the NGOs within it. 
The government‟s recreation and sport agencies exert a substantial 
influence over the sport sector. In the 1970s, government allocated very little 
funding to the Council for Recreation and Sport forcing it to focus on small 
scale programmes and the development of strategies for sport. From 1987 
onwards, large funding pools sourced from taxpayer funds and from the state 
lottery, Lotto, became available to the Hillary Commission until 2001 and 
SPARC from 2002 onwards. While keen to benefit from the expertise in the 
voluntary sector, these agencies appeared less keen to engage the sport 
sector on its views about different ways of implementing their approach to 
government funding support. The chronology of government‟s involvement in 
the New Zealand recreation and sport sector from 1937-2002 helps to explain 
how government actions shaped the sector, and the role of non-government 
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organisations (NGOs) which run sport. The chronology focuses on the impact 
on sport of government engagement with sport and the need for a fully 
developed government sport policy. Two important contexts will frame the 
chronology. First, the perspectives of sport organisations as members of a 
wider NGO sector, where sport performance and administration progressed 
from an amateur base in 1937 to a complex mix of amateur and professional 
environments by the turn of the century. Second, changes in the public policy 
environment over time affected the way in which government interacted with 
NGOs. Sport NGOs were not immune from these effects.  
Setting the scene 
Government has initiated three major reviews of the New Zealand 
national sport system since 1937. In each case, the minister responsible for 
sport appointed eminent citizens as a specialist committee, board, council or 
commission which then consulted with the sport sector on what was wrong 
and what features of the system could be changed. The consultation process 
for each review followed a similar process of a committee seeking 
submissions then generating a report to the relevant minister. In the absence 
of a co-ordinated „voice‟ for sport, smaller organisations within the broader 
sector advocated for their own constituents (e.g., coaching, sport science, 
physical education, badminton and hockey). In the main, these organisations 
lacked sufficient weight to become viable and critical actors in the 
government‟s subsequent strategies. Each committee made 
recommendations for the development of policies for sport and for their 
implementation. In some instances, the committees established structures 
such as regional sports trusts in the 1980s and 1990s. 
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The sport sector comprises nearly half of all NGOs in New Zealand. 
These organisations represent the interests of some 500,000 volunteers 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2007, 44; Sport and Recreation New Zealand, 
2006a, 2) and an opportunity for citizens to participate in the recreation and 
sport dimension of public life. By definition, NGOs comprise members or 
people of like interest that provide a mandate for the organisation to act on 
behalf of members or other beneficiaries to deliver services and to advocate 
for particular causes.2 In the realm of sport, local and regional NGOs belong 
to coalitions of regional and national federations who hold the mandate for 
each sport. No single organisation speaks for those national federations. The 
task of gathering the input from the sport sector to inform an emerging 
government policy, therefore, is more complex. In a contemporary setting, a 
strong imperative exists for such input to ensure the development of sound 
policy. When commenting on the importance of government consultation on 
policy development, Bridgman and Davis (2004) note: 
Increasingly, citizens want a say between elections on choices 
affecting their community. Governments are learning to include 
participation in the policy cycle (p. 78). 
Public policy requires a mandate: an authority to act. It requires 
funding. It also requires deep and rigorous thinking about the long term results 
expected from policy and the means to its implementation including 
resources. 
 
2
 Statistics New Zealand (2007) utilises the International Classification System for Non-profit 
Organisations. To obtain classification as a non-profit organisation under this system, an 
organisation must meet the following criteria. It must be organised, not set up to make a profit, 
not distributing profits, separate from government, self-governing and having voluntary 
membership. 
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In the context of government intervention in New Zealand sport, it is 
unclear whether sport sector administrators throughout the period this study 
examines, understood the role of public sector officials in the policy 
development process. The prospect of a particular sector (in this case, sport) 
fully understanding and building on its knowledge of public policy processes 
which affect it across a seventy year period seems improbable. Bridgman and 
Davies (2004) illustrate the practical impact on citizens of a knowledge 
shortfall about the policy process: 
The reality is that most public policy development takes place within 
the public sector. It is public servants who write the documents on 
which decisions are based. Ministers relate externally to the 
community, their political party, their constituents and the stakeholders 
in the portfolio, but rely on public servants to manage the process 
especially in the early and later stages of policy development. (p. 79) 
In the modern environment of policy development, engagement 
processes take centre stage. Sankar (2003) comments 
Citizen engagement refers to processes through which government 
seeks to encourage deliberation, reflection, and learning on issues at 
preliminary stages of a policy process often when the focus is more on 
the values and principles that will frame the way an issue is 
considered. (p. 2) 
This approach to governance assumes that the community‟s knowledge and 
experience adds significant and positive advantages to the development of 
policy and the planning of its implementation. A successful public policy is one 
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which achieves consensus between community-based interest groups and the 
policy makers. The history of government‟s involvement also tells us a great 
deal about why the current system looks like it does. 
Insights into government‟s policy development processes and in 
particular, the challenges inherent to seeking out and nurturing a voice for 
sport to speak in those processes help to explain the evolution of the New 
Zealand sport system. This study provides signposts to a different way of 
working and to the goal of achieving a policy built on a consensus and shared 
purpose between government and the sport sector. 
The Approach 
In order to track how government controlled its involvement in sport, I 
describe the public administration dimension of four distinct legislative eras: 
the Physical Welfare Act 1937, the Recreation and Sport Act 1973, the 
Recreation and Sport Act 1987 (and its subsequent renaming in 1992 as the 
Sport, Fitness and Leisure Act), and the Sport and Recreation Act 2002.  
The study recounts the chronology through a public management lens 
in three ways. First, the government undertook each of its sport reviews in the 
public policy context of the time. Today‟s governments require public 
policymakers to draw on a wide range of policy instruments to ensure the best 
use of public funds once policy goals and objectives are clear (Althaus, 
Bridgman & Davis, 2007, 87). In the past, instruments of legislation and 
regulation prevailed. In the 1990s, however, a more diverse range of 
instruments emerged as changing theories of pluralism influenced 
government behaviour (Mulgan, 2004, 16; Shaw & Eichbaum, 2005, 174). In 
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other words, instead of passive compliance with government policy 
development and service delivery planning, citizens sought active 
engagement and participation in government (Ibid. 176-177).  
Second, contemporary literature on public sector accountability 
identifies delegation as a central idea in democratic states and for modern 
governments in the Westminster tradition (Lupia, 2003, 33). Moreover, Wise 
(2004, 668) comments that individual citizens‟ different perceptions of public 
service motivation and lines of accountability in government are both 
ambiguous and woven through with similarly different perceptions of self-
interest. This ambiguity, argues Wise, extends to the implementation of 
delegation and advancing the public interest (Ibid. 669). 
A chain of delegation extends from ministers to the government sport 
funding agencies, which leads to interactions between government funders 
and sport NGOs. Delegations of this kind produce effects along the chain. For 
example, government agencies behave according to the pressures imposed 
upon them primarily from above. The government of the day exerts pressure 
via the portfolio minister. Parliament applies pressure to the government 
which then responds to citizens through the electoral cycle. Each player along 
the chain delegates power and responsibility down to the next link in the 
chain. A requirement to be accountable for the powers and responsibilities, 
which the delegation brings, accompanies each step in the chain. Such 
delegation created an impact on many NGOs including those in the sport 
sector. 
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The third public management perspective comes from a more recent 
public sector focus on government‟s priorities or outcomes and the need for 
government agencies to collaborate with each other and with third parties in 
achieving those outcomes. For this to occur in the sport sector, government 
and sport NGOs need a shared understanding of performance measurement 
and what is meant by „results‟. New Zealand government agencies received 
clear State Services Commission (SSC) guidance on this topic from 2002 
onwards (State Services Commission, 2002) as government paid closer 
attention to making outcomes central to planning and ensuring that 
departments provided plausible reports on performance to parliament. 
Critically, a shared sense of performance measurement requires a shared 
sense of purpose by all parties and a shared sense of what to do. 
In sum, the study focuses on responses from the public sector and 
sport NGOs to given events in the chronology. My participation in many of 
events in the chronology, makes an objective narrative difficult. In some 
cases, little documentation exists to confirm the role of specific individuals at 
given points along the timeline. The study therefore adopts a mix of 
explanatory paradigms. The evolution of New Zealand‟s public management 
system gave rise to social pressures which affected NGOs in unintended and 
unplanned ways. Proving cause and effect relationships in the social sphere 
are the source of much debate in the literature (Booth, 2005, 144). The 
interaction of government and NGO behaviour over time, provides plausible 
explanations for today‟s state of play.  
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The political context also colours the telling of events. Sport exists 
within a wider social context and for this study, in wider public policy context. I 
make comments on the strengths or weaknesses in the decisions of 
government and non-government actors in the story with the benefit of 
hindsight and contemporary beliefs about public policy and interaction 
between the state and NGOs. In this wider context, the study shows how 
government involvement in sport also followed contemporary thinking on 
public policy development and, from time to time, social policy thinking. 
Chapter two examines the impact of the Physical Welfare Act in 1937. 
The Act established the physical welfare service and confirmed, for the first 
time, government‟s direct interest in encouraging participation in sport. In 
these early years of the welfare state in New Zealand, government saw its 
role clearly to provide social, health and education services to citizens. The 
private choice of recreation and sport did not attract great public policy 
attention. A strong personal interest in physical fitness from the then Minister 
for Internal Affairs, William Parry, however, championed new legislation 
designed to encourage a more co-ordinated national approach to sport 
participation. 
The Act‟s wording paid little attention to the leadership roles of NGOs 
in the sport sector. Only a few sports (e.g., rugby, tennis and bowls) had a 
major national presence. The physical welfare service focused its attention on 
a broad recreation agenda rather than sport NGOs. Governments of the day 
focused their social policy attention on the impact of World War Two initially 
and the post War recovery period from 1945 onwards. The sport sector made 
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little headway in persuading government to provide a substantial financial 
contribution to a national sport system. Despite provisions of the Act that he 
could engage with the sport sector, the minister showed little interest in such 
engagement. This era provided few clear signals about government‟s 
understanding of sport in a public policy setting. 
Chapter three recounts the establishment of a new ministry of 
recreation and sport and a council for recreation and sport. Commitment to a 
new ministry formed part of the incoming Labour government‟s manifesto in 
1972. The manifesto‟s high level commitment to an organisational outcome, 
however, did not address the day-to-day detail of how a minister, a ministry 
and a council might interact. It was left to the public service to make it work. 
The sport sector, including the council members, conceived of government‟s 
new involvement in sport as a new era with access to new resources. The 
public management system, however, had an impact on the system in ways 
sport sector administrators did not recognise or understand. The new council 
was one amongst many arms-length organisations set up by government to 
do particular work. Throughout the decade, these organisations proliferated 
with little clear guidance to „core‟ departments on managing their 
performance. Distinguished public servant John Martin (2003) describes these 
organisations as: 
An assortment of commissions, authorities, tribunals and committees 
that had been established piecemeal over the years to exercise public 
power or to advise ministers outside the ambit of the departments of 
state. (p. 137) 
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The ministry controlled the money and therefore the success or failure of the 
council. A wide range of strong interests significantly influenced the 
government vision of an improved national recreation and sport system. 
The power imbalance between ministry and council sowed the seeds 
for later pressure from influential politicians in the sport sector to remove any 
policy responsibility from a government department and vest it in the arms-
length agency. While these tensions played out in Wellington, the rest of sport 
sector looked on, dealing with day-to-day resource pressures and 
preoccupied with their narrow interests and issues. 
Chapter four recounts the actions of a new Labour government in 1984 
which initiated massive economic and social reform. Dissatisfaction with the 
council and ministry led to pressure from the sport sector prior to the 1984 
general election to review the whole sport system. A ministerial inquiry into 
sport after the election produced two reports Sport on the Move and 
Recreation and Government in New Zealand. The coincidence of public 
sector reforms and the ministerial inquiry set the stage for subsequent 
relationships between sport NGOs and a new government sport agency. The 
chapter comments on the inquiry itself, its final report and establishment of the 
new government body, the Hillary Commission. Within four years of the 
commission‟s establishment, the term „sport, fitness and leisure‟ replaced 
„recreation and sport‟ in the Act as the minister for sport John Banks, 
refocused the commission on funding physical leisure and sport specifically 
rather than the existing broader spectrum of recreation organisations. The 
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chapter points to the lack of an evidence base for sport policy decisions and 
the impact on sport of public sector reforms as applied by the commission. 
Chapter five tells the story of a particular moment in the first decade of 
the Hillary Commission‟s life. The Prime Minister‟s Review of High 
Performance Sport, shed daylight onto the behaviours of three dominant 
organisations in New Zealand sport, the commission itself, the New Zealand 
Sports Foundation (NZSF) and the New Zealand Olympic and Commonwealth 
Games Association (NZOCGA) - now the New Zealand Olympic Committee 
(NZOC). Prime minister Jim Bolger sought opportunities for New Zealand 
arising from Australia‟s successful bid to host the 2000 Olympiad in Sydney. 
The opportunity for Olympic medal success ranked high amongst those 
benefits and that, Jim Bolger concluded, required government funding. 
The three organisations named above, claimed mandates for their 
territory within the sporting landscape, yet none actually managed a sporting 
code. Only the NZOCGA had a cross-sector mandate and that only to 
commission teams to Olympic and Commonwealth Games. Accordingly, 
prime minister Bolger appointed a review committee chaired by New Zealand 
rugby icon and corporate leader Wilson Whineray. The committee brought 
public, private and NGO interests together with a brief to create new 
organisational arrangements to fund elite sport and to recommend levels of 
government contributions. 
Attempts to forge an alliance between the three organisations through 
membership of the review committee led to new and significant funding 
recommendations. Their collaboration and the resulting funding processes 
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aimed to shift sport funding from the „command and control‟ environment of 
the past to a more collaborative environment. Throughout the review, sport 
NGOs watched from the sideline, as a critical new funding regime emerged 
which affected their management of elite sport for the next decade. 
Chapter six describes the demise of the Hillary Commission and 
emergence of a new agency, the New Zealand Recreation and Sport 
Commission (SPARC). A ministerially-driven review of the New Zealand sport 
system in 2001 triggered the change which led to SPARC and new 
commitments of taxpayer funding. Chaired by leading educator, John 
Graham, the ministerial committee sought, like its 1984 counterpart to review 
and reform the national sport delivery system. Although of a similar 
aspirational quality as the 1984 inquiry, the Graham committee‟s report 
Getting Fit for an Active Nation focused much more on potential public health 
benefits from sport participation. In addition, the committee recommended that 
the Hillary Commission be replaced by a new government agency, Sport and 
Recreation New Zealand; similar in structure and powers, but with a new 
brand name - SPARC.  
Government responded positively to the Graham review‟s 
recommendations replacing the commission and for the first time, made new 
and large commitments of taxpayer funds to recreation and sport starting at 
$18.141 million in 2002/2003 to $69 million in 2007/2008. With these 
substantial new funds came increased power and influence. SPARC‟s 
resources dominated the sport sector landscape and the language of 
“investment” characterised its approach to funding decisions. The chapter 
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discusses the early impact of SPARC and, in particular, how its funding 
approach aligned with government‟s wishes to emphasise collaboration and 
engagement with the community sector. The chapter also focuses on the 
need for engagement with sport NGOs and a sector perspective on 
government sport policy.  
The study ends by drawing together the accumulated results of the 
engagement chronology and the public policy results for sport. The final 
chapter proposes a set of prerequisites for ensuring sport sector engagement 
to ensure a robust public policy in sport and the importance of consensus 
between government and sport NGOs in building the policy. For now, backed 
with over $100 million in taxpayer and lottery funds, SPARC‟s long-term 
impact on the New Zealand sport sector is yet to be fully understood. 
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Chapter Two – 1937: A Physical Welfare Perspective 
This chapter describes the 1937-1973 physical welfare era of 
government‟s involvement in sport. The intervention of World War II meant 
that new thinking and policy development for sport and recreation in New 
Zealand ranked low in government‟s priorities. As a new policy area, 
recreation and sport did not draw on a long history of government action and 
like many new policy areas, had its genesis under the administration of the 
Department of Internal Affairs (DIA). The chapter canvasses DIA‟s actions 
and the extent to which sport NGOs participated in what followed. The 
politically neutral New Zealand public service is one of the world‟s oldest with 
that characteristic (Martin, 2006, 2). Its reactions to the new responsibility 
drew on that history. 
Between 1935 and 1937, the fourth Labour government promoted a 
range of social legislation in the aftermath of the Great Depression and 
profoundly changed the face of New Zealand society. Under the leadership of 
Michael Savage, the government made healthcare accessible and affordable 
and, for the first time, low cost housing became the responsibility of the state. 
A New Zealand social welfare system set out to provide security for all 
citizens including those who were unemployed. The new system introduced 
free access to secondary schooling and tertiary education and the 40 hour 
week. 
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Gustafson (1986, 221) observes that Savage‟s achievement in the 
founding of the modern welfare state in New Zealand was the “crowning 
achievement of the Labour government and probably the most important 
single piece of legislation in New Zealand‟s history.” In this context, the 
government also expressed a desire to stimulate an interest in physical 
activity, in part, to promote physical fitness for its own sake and, in part, to 
promote participation in physical activity as a social activity.  
In 1937, the minister for internal affairs, W E Parry sponsored the 
physical welfare and recreation bill. Parry was widely recognised as an 
advocate for recreation and sport as his peer and member for Auckland 
Central, noted in Hansard “We know that the Minister is a keen devotee of 
physical training and is to be seen frequently at the punchball in the 
gymnasium of this building.” (Office of the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives [OCHR], 1937, 421). Parry consulted widely with sport NGOs 
to promote the bill and staged two conferences with them prior to the enacting 
of the legislation (Buchanan, 1978, 25). At the second conference in August 
1937, Parry initiated a discussion concerning the establishment of a National 
Council of Sport and Recreation, a proposal supported by many NGOs. 
Among the resolutions passed by the conference, two warrant highlighting. 
First, the conference agreed to take national action to promote the idea that 
“physical fitness and physical recreation have a vital part to play in promoting 
a healthy mind and human happiness” (OCHR, 1937, 524). Second, that if the 
conference formed a national council of sport and recreation, the government 
was best positioned to make sure it was a truly „national‟ in character. Parry 
 22 
was not keen on the idea of an elected body by “sectional national interests”. 
(Ibid. 524) 
It is unclear whether Parry had concerns about a specific sectional 
interest or whether he was merely reflecting the mood of a government which 
was acting to provide a comprehensive set of social policies for all New 
Zealanders. In any case, Parry went on to argue that “the whole question of 
sport and recreation generally, [is] of such national importance, in connection 
with the national use of increased leisure, to warrant the immediate attention 
of the Government and the people generally.” (Ibid. 524) 
The bill provoked extensive debate in the parliament, particularly with 
respect to those provisions that gave the minister powers over the council 
including the ability to making grants of money to sport organisations. The 
broader question, however, of encouraging participation in sport and 
recreation through government legislation, remained unclear (Alexander, 
1981, 15). During the next 70 years, consistently without the benefit of robust 
evidence successive governments would make similar broad claims of sport‟s 
benefit to society. 
Enacted in 1937 and administered by DIA, the Physical Welfare Act 
provided for a Council of Physical Welfare and Training, a body established 
the following year (Green, 2001). The council reproduced the English model, 
the Central Council for Physical and Recreative Training established in 1935 
when English politicians sought to enhance the physical fitness of young 
people at a time of high unemployment and an economic downturn (Central 
Council for Physical Recreation, 2007). 
 23 
The new Council for Physical Welfare and Training met for the first time 
on 24 May 1938 and comprised 17 members chaired by Parry in his capacity 
as minister for internal affairs. The council membership comprised a mix of 
senior public servants and individuals from across New Zealand, all appointed 
by the minister. Rather than appointing members with a formal mandate from 
the sport sector, instead, the minister sought to ensure regional interests were 
seen to be represented (Green, 2001). 
While it is unclear whether the sport NGOs supported the minister‟s 
twelve appointees, he charged the council with co-ordinating “the interest of 
all sporting bodies in the development of a policy that would be in accord with 
the objectives of the Act” (OCHR, 1937, 528). Like Britain, New Zealand sport 
was (and still is) based on an amateur club-based system of voluntary NGOs 
who had little interaction with central government and little or no experience of 
managing government funding support.  
Section 9 of the Act gave the government significant power over the 
council and enabled it to direct policy. Although the government did not have 
a majority on the council, the minister had effective control by virtue of his 
right to veto the council‟s recommendations. The Act contained a whole-of-
government dimension reflected not only in the council‟s membership, but 
also in its other functions under section 9. In summary these included 
 educating school children on the benefits of and participation in 
sport including once they had left school 
 making provisions for participation in all forms of physical 
development 
 24 
 stimulating national interest by propaganda 
 ensuring the availability of facilities for participation in all sports 
 establishing a  source of funding from central and local 
governments and  other contributors 
 fostering sportsmanship and the enjoyment and benefits of physical 
fitness 
 disseminating information relevant to physical exercise generally 
 making recommendations with the respect to the well-being of 
people generally. 
In one sense, these wide-ranging functions provided the genesis of a 
policy framework for government intervention in sport. However, the council 
made little or no progress on any of these matters. Following its first meeting, 
the council met only three times in 1938 and a further three more times over 
the next six years until September 1944 after which it ceased to meet. It is 
hard to assess whether or not the council‟s functions were appropriate or too 
great. Moreover, it is not clear whether major shifts occurred in government 
attitudes towards the role of sport and recreation in meeting the goals of 
government. It seems likely that government perceived sport more simply as a 
way of bringing communities together as a form of social good. In the 
meantime, the physical welfare branch in DIA continued with its work quite 
disconnected from the council. 
Buchanan (1978) observes that there was “little evidence of the council 
carrying out its duties as specified in the Act” (p. 38). Those duties included 
developing policies to encourage sporting bodies to co-operate with the 
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education department. Parry was personally keen to promote an interest in 
sport and recreation within schools. Further, he initially asked the new council 
to survey recreational needs and facilities throughout the country. As council 
chair, Parry secured a small fund for the council to distribute as it saw fit 
within the portfolio‟s parameters. Given the council‟s inactivity, even that fund 
went unspent establishing sporting fund. From the paucity of documentation 
between the council and minister, the council also seemed unable to fulfil its 
duty as an advisory body to the minister. 
A lack of commitment to the council perhaps signals that ministers did 
not yet consider sport funding a priority for public policy. Council meetings 
were at the behest of the minister and, given his other cabinet responsibilities, 
clearly he did not do this regularly or frequently. Unsurprisingly, the council 
failed to exert influence given the lack of opportunities for it to meet and 
develop ideas. The phenomenon of insufficient time to meet and consider 
policy issues characterised a future Labour government‟s Council of 
Recreation and Sport in the 1970s and 1980s, over 30 years later. No records 
exist to explain why Parry did not convene the council more often and his 
commitment to the role of the council remains uncertain. Despite a lack of 
leadership from the council, the physical welfare branch in DIA continued its 
extensive work to promote physical activity, mostly at the local level but not 
with the national sport organisations. There were more pressing matters, 
however, for Joseph Savage‟s government.  
The government‟s attention was on the war effort and social policy 
issues were likely to have been high on cabinet‟s agenda. Parry was also 
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minister of pensions and in 1940, Savage gave Parry responsibility for 
implementing Savage‟s flagship Social Security Act. Establishing a vigorous 
sports council of any sort ultimately took second place to national efforts to 
support the economy during the second world war. Upon declaring war in 
1939, the New Zealand government passed a series of regulations giving it 
wide powers. Amongst those powers was the conscription of thousands of 
men to the armed forces (Baker 1965, 80). Inevitably, initiatives to promote 
sport were not prominent at this time. 
Buchanan (1978, 40) also observes that while the war effort interrupted 
the council‟s potential work programme, correspondence on departmental 
files indicates that the council had great difficulty providing leadership and co-
ordination across government departments. Philip Smithells (1940), 
superintendent of physical education for the department of education spoke 
bluntly on the matter: “It would seem to me, and certainly to some of my 
colleagues, that there is simply too much talking and not enough action.”  
The enthusiastic welcoming of the Physical Welfare Act by sport NGOs 
evaporated quickly. There is no evidence that either the council or the 
physical welfare branch of DIA actively worked with sport NGOs to encourage 
and support greater participation in sport. The physical welfare branch 
employed staff throughout New Zealand including many prominent New 
Zealand sportsmen; and a few sportswomen (Stothart, 1977, 20). One such 
staff member was Lance Cross, later to be an influential figure in the sport 
sector and an International Olympic Committee member. 
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While the council promoted a number of schemes, such as leadership 
training and recreational experimental areas, these were achieved „on the 
ground‟ through schools and local government by field staff officials from the 
physical welfare branch of the department. Programmes included „learn to 
swim‟ and „mountain safety‟. These, formed the genesis of today‟s NGOs the 
New Zealand Water Safety Council and the New Zealand Mountain Safety 
Council. The schemes focused strongly on recreation and had little contact 
with sport NGOs with branch officials continuing to focus their work on 
schools and on programmes with local government. 
The 1937 Act also provided for the establishment of district 
committees, appointed by the minister and with a wide range of functions. In 
sum, however, the committees acted as agents for the national council in 
Wellington. The language of the Act reflected a centralised „command and 
control‟ approach to management. For example, the district committees were 
to “represent the National Council”, “make investigations and enquiries as 
directed by the Council,” (Physical Welfare Act 1937, s.30).and “to carry out 
any functions instructed by the Council” (Ibid.).  
The goal of district committees implementing a national strategy at the 
local level failed. In their studies of the physical welfare branch, Buchanan 
(1977, 44) and Alexander (1981, 29) both note that the committees were 
starved of funds, lacked clear goals and received insufficient direction from 
the council.  
In 1943, the council advocated revisiting the idea of a New Zealand 
sports council. Like the 1938 initiative, however, the council met no more than 
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a handful of times, made no decisions, and appears to have faded away; a 
lack of significant achievements leading to its demise. In 1948, the Public 
Service Commission reviewed the council and concluded that it no longer 
achieved any useful purpose (Public Service Commission, 1949). 
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, local communities formed local 
sports councils. Where a national body instructing from Wellington had failed, 
„grass roots‟ motivation succeeded. It was not long before the local councils 
began to think beyond local community boundaries. In the absence of any 
national action from the national sports council, sports officials took it upon 
themselves to form local sports councils during the late 1930s and early 
1940s. On 24 November 1943, fourteen national governing bodies of sport 
and 12 provincial sports councils adopted a constitution and elected a 
volunteer management committee for the first New Zealand Council of Sport. 
(Buchanan, 1978, 47). In September 1943, representatives of these Councils 
agreed to form a national council of sport (Ibid. 47).  
Unfortunately, the volunteer council failed to obtain unanimous support 
from all sport NGOs with tennis, rugby and bowls refusing to participate 
(Stothart, 1978, 37-46). The council therefore lacked influence and, in the 
public‟s and sport sector‟s mind, its role was confused with the government‟s 
largely inactive National Council of Physical Welfare and Recreation. 
(Buchanan, 1978, 49). Lee (1966, 20) also suggests that some of the major 
sport NGOs were suspicious of the government‟s motivation for setting up a 
council. Without support from codes which dominated participation numbers, 
the council faded away and no records of its activity exist after 1947. 
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DIA carried responsibility for communications to sport organisations 
about government ideas such as a sports council. Non-specialist staff and a 
lack of departmental commitment to engaging with sport administrators may 
have contributed to these ideas failing to gain momentum. This was borne out 
in 1948 by the PSC investigation into the branch described earlier in this 
chapter. 
Throughout this time, DIA established its own approach to 
administering the Physical Welfare and Recreation Act. The department 
appointed physical welfare officers, to undertake a broad range of tasks in 
addition to supporting the Council for Physical Welfare and Training.  
The government also required DIA to account for taxpayer funds it 
used to support the council. Although at „arms length‟ from the government, 
the council still reported on its performance to the parliament (via DIA). 
Unusually for an „arms length‟ body, the minister of internal affairs served as 
the council chair. This had the effect of giving the minister a considerable 
control over council decisions and reduced the public service arm of the 
portfolio to implementing programmes such as those for „leadership training‟, 
„learn to swim‟, and promoting recreation opportunities for tourism (Alexander, 
1981, 31). As a semi-independent body at „arms length‟ to the department, the 
council could theoretically make its own decisions about funding priorities. 
However, with the minister in the chair, the sport sector perceived council 
decisions as the minister‟s decisions. In any case, the council rarely met. 
The broad purposes of the Act described earlier, required buy-in from 
across the sport sector. While the early signals issued by William Parry 
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initially encouraged the sport sector, in the absence of tangible results and 
improvements in their day-to-day circumstances, sports NGOs withdrew from 
any direct engagement. By the end of its life, there is no evidence of 
meaningful links between the council and the sport sector. 
In an extensive review of the physical welfare branch, Harris (1971) 
details constraints and obstacles which the branch had to overcome. Most 
significantly, the branch was unable to convince local government to work 
towards the government‟s goals. Local authorities had their own goals and 
priorities and saw little benefit in working with central government. Then as 
now, local government owned the vast majority of recreation and sport assets: 
swimming pools, playing fields and sports halls. No estimates of their overall 
value exist from at that time. A Hillary Commission estimate in the 1998 
provides a sense of the local government stake in recreation and sport overall 
with around $3.5 billion in recreation and sport assets and a with net annual 
expenditure totalling $338.45 million - GST exclusive (Hillary Commission, 
1998, 30). 
Harris‟s report makes no reference to the branch‟s impact on the wider 
sport sector. Moreover, no records exist to show that the branch canvassed 
issues such as improving the level of participation in sport in any depth and 
certainly not in relation to the delivery of sport by national sport organisations. 
The PSC review of the branch mentioned earlier in this chapter 
investigated the basis for concerns about the branch‟s lack of effectiveness 
and DIA‟s management, the PSC initiated a review of the branch mentioned 
earlier and appointed a three-man investigating committee to address the 
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issues. The committee comprised H C D (Crawford) Somerset, a respected 
community educator and University Lecturer, G F (George) Briggs from the 
YMCA and Public Service Commissioner, A H („Bert‟) O‟Keefe as chair 
(Stothart, 1977, 24).  
Stothart (Ibid. 24) notes that the committee‟s final report reflected 
poorly on DIA generally and the physical welfare branch in particular. For 
example, branch officials were vague about the purpose of the council and the 
extent of its authority. The PSC committee also recorded a litany of branch 
shortcomings ranging from a failure to implement specific provisions of the 
Physical Welfare Act (appointing a senior physical welfare officer) to the non-
training of field staff. This highly critical report recommended the transfer of 
the branch and its responsibilities from DIA to the department of education. 
Despite the strength of critique from the PSC, ministers did not carry out its 
recommendations. Nothing in records of the time explains why government 
ignores the PSC‟s recommendations.  
A new National party government came to power in 1949, and the branch 
continued with its existing work programme. The new government had no 
particular policy in mind for recreation and sport and focused its attention on 
other social policy issues of youth delinquency. The establishment of the 
National Youth Council in 1953 led to yet another attempt to revive the sports 
council idea. Like the previous sports council, it attracted little support. 
Parliament voted only small amounts of funding in the post-war period 
(see Table 1 Government funding of Recreation and Sport 1945-1956  below). DIA 
allocated these funds mostly as grants or subsidies to sport NGOs (national 
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and local) for coaching activities, building projects and equipment. The 
minister argued for these funds in the annual budget round without the benefit 
of clear policy work from DIA officials or a clearly communicated sense of 
what government hoped to achieve from projects supported by these funds. 
Table 1 Government funding of Recreation and Sport 1945-1956  
Fiscal year Vote Funding 
1945/1946 $3,295 
1946/1947 $37,250 
1947/1948 $44,650 
1948/1949 $49,646 
1950/1951 $25,000 
1951/1952 $10,000 
1952/1953 $10,000 
1953/1954 $[data unavailable] 
1954/1955 $12,304 
1955/1956 $12,500 
 
In 1954, the National government directed a reduction in branch 
staffing as part of an overall drive to cut public service costs. Stothart (1977, 
27) notes that it took a further critique from the SSC in 1956, for this to be 
carried out. By this time, the branch ceased to function effectively and in 
1965, the department restructured the unit to become the youth services 
branch. As noted earlier, records of interaction between the physical welfare 
branch staff and their minister are sparse. Close contact with a minister by a 
small unit of the department would be unusual. In the absence of specialised 
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advice to the minister, therefore, sport policy remained fragmented lacking 
any form of coherent overview. This situation applied elsewhere in the state 
sector with the evolution of New Zealand‟s public service and public 
policymaking having slowed considerably during the 1930s. Martin (2006) 
notes: 
Despite the increasing role of the state…… the condition of the state 
services themselves was not high on the agenda of the Labour 
administration. When approached in March 1936 about the vacant 
position of Public Service Commissioner……Savage is reported as 
saying that this was „one of the very least of the questions they [the 
government] had to deal with. (p. 12) 
The department had a responsibility, however, to be clear with its 
minister on what it thought needed to be done within the departmental 
portfolio ambit. During this era, New Zealand retained a highly centralised 
public management system and therefore public servants held considerable 
influence over public policy decisions. Then as now, the most effective 
departments are those which actively engage their ministers in a dialogue on 
future actions (Scott, 2001, 111).  
The Social Security Act provides an important context for the physical 
welfare and recreation legislation. The Labour government‟s raft of reforms 
represented the state taking responsibility for “the health, income 
maintenance and general welfare of the community” (OCHR, 1972, 46). Parry 
conceived his physical welfare and recreation ideas as being part of the 
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overall state welfare programme (Stothart, 1977, 15). In one sense, Parry 
placed recreation and sport in a social services context.  
Governments design systems by reserving certain powers through 
legislation and delegating powers to others. Over time, the interplay of 
reserved and delegated powers shape the key inter-relationships among such 
forces and pressures as physical structure, reward systems, values and 
beliefs, work processes, unwritten rules, written rules, and information flow 
(Palmer & Palmer, 1997, 129; Scott, 2003, 413). The Physical Welfare Act 
attempted to bring good health and social cohesion to society through 
encouraging citizens to participate in physical exercise through recreation and 
sport activities. Over time, the impact of and support for the Act fell away. In 
their analysis of welfare state structures, Matthews and Erickson (2005, 3) 
observe that social programme initiatives enjoy high levels of public support 
when the programme benefits are more universally experienced. 
Communities generally and the sport sector particularly saw few tangible 
benefits of the Act‟s implementation. Neither politicians nor public 
policymakers advanced ideas about citizens‟ access to recreation and sport 
as an important or emerging aspect of government policy. 
Alexander (1981, 46), in one of the few examinations of the Act‟s 
history, suggests that that the values of state structures such as those 
provided in the Act, are based on their representativeness, non-partisan 
competence and leadership. ithin this framework, provisions of the Physical 
Welfare and Recreation Act attempted to provide leadership via the minister, 
representation of sport through the district committees and the membership of 
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the council and politically neutral public service involvement via the physical 
welfare branch. It seems unlikely, however, that either the minister or DIA 
conceived of such formal linkages. No evidence exists of attempts by 
government to build a sport sector consensus. 
It seems more likely that DIA‟s own thinking about its role ignored how 
best to represent the „voice‟ of sport in policy decisions and what voluntary 
sport organisations thought about the status quo in any case. Moreover, in the 
absence of a mandated voice for sport, leadership fell to powerful individuals 
such as Parry himself who were able to influence other ministers and 
therefore public policy processes around the sport delivery system. In sum, 
the voluntary and amateur club-based sport system of New Zealand had little 
collective power and few sufficiently powerful individuals to lobby for its 
interests. 
The role of a minister who served as council chair proved problematic. 
In the Westminster tradition, ministers make high-level policy decisions and 
government agencies implement that policy. In this case, however, a failure to 
separate the two, compromised potential success from the outset. Further, the 
council had few powers and was in no position to engage the exclusively 
amateur sport NGOs systematically. The intervention of the second world war 
meant that neither the government nor sport NGOs pursued potential 
opportunities presenting from a national sport council „voice for sport‟.  
After the war, New Zealand governments focused their attention on 
rebuilding the economy from a war footing and the public funding of sport or 
sports facilities took a lower priority. However, in the early 1950s and in a 
 36 
similar vein to their English counterparts, ministers expressed concerns about 
the welfare of young people and the need to encourage their participation in a 
wide range of „useful‟ activities including sport. 
In 1954, the government gave effect to this focus on youth policy 
matters and established the Special Committee on Moral Delinquency in 
Children and Adolescents chaired by Dr Oswald Mazengarb a Wellington 
Queen‟s Counsel. The Mazengarb committee‟s report, confirmed some 
generally held views concerning increasing urbanisation and the lack of 
provision for health and recreation. The report maintained perceptions of links 
between community health status and physical recreation. It made a very 
strong connection between access to recreation and perceived lowering of 
youth values. “As in other forms of delinquency, the recent outbreak of 
immorality or, more correctly, the revealed evidence of it has directed the 
minds of many to an assumed dearth of organized recreation and 
entertainment” (Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives 
of New Zealand, 1954, 35).  
The Mazengarb committee concluded that if a young person were to 
join sporting clubs, the less likelihood that person would “become a 
delinquent” (Ibid. 35). This conclusion in 1954 resonates with the views 
expressed in 2007 by New Zealand‟s principal youth court judge Andrew 
Becroft who said: “A young person involved in sport, or any organised, 
positive community activity, stays out of Youth Court.” Little data exists to 
confirm Becroft‟s view and similarly, the Mazengarb committee‟s report was 
strong on assumptions, however, and light on well-researched evidence. Its 
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conclusions lacked support from any empirical data to connect „moral 
delinquency‟ and a lack of participation in physical recreation. The report built 
its assumptions about why physical recreation would help to stem a perceived 
increase in young people‟s delinquent behaviour mostly around strong and 
wide-ranging representation from hundreds of submissions (written and oral). 
Only one submission came from a sport NGO, the Wellington hockey 
association.  
While the Mazengarb report did not purport to be „sport policy‟ advice, it 
provides an insight to society‟s general assumptions then as now about sport 
participation. In the sense that youth delinquency was and remains, a political 
issue, government policies tend to build on connections which citizens create 
between that issue and a particular set of beliefs and values. Ministers of 
sport since 1973 have built on those connections despite sparse evidence 
and few measures to inform policymakers. Policy is not value-free. It tends to 
reveal values that really matter to government and probably to the public 
official(s) whose advice first led to the policy (Shaw, 2003, 149). Boston et al 
(1998) comment specifically about policy advice: 
Such [policy] advice is thus fundamentally about values: which values 
matter, how they should be ranked and how those given priority should 
be maximised. (p. 123) 
Alexander (1981) argued that the Physical Welfare and Recreation 
Act‟s broad purpose “…to improve health through recreation and physical 
activity” (p. 42), hampered implementation of any policy intent. In effect, the 
Act‟s weakness was lack of detail in the Act on implementation. It seems more 
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likely, however that a common public policy fault was responsible: a failure to 
plan delivery. Parliament legislates high-level goals. Public servants of the 
day, are responsible for ensuring plans for policy implementation are properly 
thought through prior to legislation going before the parliament for debate. 
This includes selecting the most appropriate delivery mechanism. In this 
instance, government supported sport NGOs to achieve public health goals. 
Ministers and the public service assumed the connections between increased 
sport participation and health outcomes. The assumptions were untested and 
probably generally agreed by the public in any case i.e., it is axiomatic that 
exercise „is good for you‟. The sport sector voice remained silent despite its 
central place in supporting increased participation. 
The emphasis on evaluating policy implementation is a relatively recent 
phenomenon in public policy writing. In their seminal work on policy 
implementation, Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) comment: 
A policy‟s value therefore must be measured not only in terms of its 
appeal but also in light of its implementability. But how would we know 
whether a programme embodying a policy had been well or poorly 
implemented? – By observing the difference between intended and 
actual consequences. (p. xv) 
These early signals of poor engagement with sport NGOs sit awkwardly a 
strong tradition of public participation which broadly characterises perceptions 
of contemporary public policy development in New Zealand. The extent of that 
participation has been uneven, however, and Cheyne et al (1994) cite 
Considine‟s observations about participatory democracy in New Zealand 
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during the 1960s and 1970s as ranging from “symbolic forms to ones that 
were more substantive” (p. 140). They also note further the neglect of such 
traditions during the 1980s and 1990s, while Wilson and Enright (1994, 139) 
reinforced an emerging New Zealand tradition of public participation. Further, 
despite claims of a broad participation tradition, in the period from the 1930s 
to the 1970s, little evidence exists of robust citizen engagement in the 
development of sport and recreation policy or, indeed of any other social 
policies.  
Throughout this period, addressing the issue of who represented the 
views of sport NGOs remained problematic. Using local government as a 
means to engage communities in achieving the Act‟s purpose had the effect 
of marginalising national sport organisations. Citizens were generally 
suspicious of government and its potential to „interfere‟ with people‟s private 
recreation choices. Consequently, instead of a coherent and collaborative 
approach emerging, sport NGOs had their earlier concerns confirmed that 
government was promoting its own agenda of sport participation and physical 
activity to meet social policy needs rather than the needs of sport. The social 
policy agenda was a reworking of the Physical Welfare Act goals, outlined 
earlier, and did not consider sport NGOs specifically as key players in the 
implementation of a social welfare policy. 
Alexander (1981, 184) also argues that government interventions in 
recreation and sport through the 1937 and 1973 legislation, were 
fundamentally about social control. The decisions of government-appointed 
councils or committees can be a means by which specific activities or classes 
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of activities can be preferred for state support and therefore given an 
advantage over other activities. This view follows British perspectives 
articulated by Roberts (1978, 156) but little evidence exists that the New 
Zealand government of that time displayed preferences for specific activities 
at a formal policy level. 
A strong „social control‟ impetus seems unlikely in this case. The sport 
NGOs themselves were enthusiastic about the possibility of novel 
arrangements with government. Parry enthusiastically advocated on behalf of 
sport and physical activity and, along with his ministerial colleagues, seemed 
to have a simple motivation for intervention i.e., that physical activity itself was 
useful to the population and the social activity which accompanied sport was 
useful for providing some form of social cohesion. 
Parry‟s leadership of the physical welfare concept did not occur in 
isolation. The goals of a fit nation and stronger communities were not new, 
and in this respect, the Labour government followed a path laid out in Britain 
between the two world wars. While Savage had his vision for New Zealand 
society, state sector reforms in Britain still influenced the foundations for New 
Zealand‟s welfare state. For instance, in 1937, the British parliament passed 
the Physical Training and Recreation Act which provided for a national 
advisory council. The timing of that council‟s formation was unfortunate with 
the start of World War II imminent and the British government worried at the 
unfit condition of its potential armed forces personnel. The Act provided for 
government run sport and fitness activities undertaken by youth organisations 
under the aegis of juvenile delinquency committees. This took the focus away 
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from sport NGOs. The Physical Training and Recreation Act, 1937, 
established a national advisory council which, in turn, set up area committees. 
In the main, area committees assessed local needs and encouraged physical 
training and recreation. Britain needed better sports facilities and the National 
Council made grant funding available from to support facility development. 
(Collins, 2003, 5) and approach which continued well into the 1960s (Coalter, 
Long & Duffield, 1988, 48). 
Despite the lack of substantive policy development, as noted earlier in 
this chapter, the New Zealand government response to sport in the 1930s 
broadly followed the lead of Britain. Other British Commonwealth countries 
had followed the lead of Britain to deal with some of the social issues 
emerging from the Great Depression through government programmes to 
promote physical activity and community cohesion (Henry 1993, 13). For 
example, Canada enacted the Unemployment and Farm Relief Act in 1931, to 
deal with a large influx of unemployed workers into the cities. In its aftermath, 
the Canadian government established the Dominion-Provincial Youth Training 
Program in 1937. Harvey (2002) observes: 
Fighting „inactivity,‟ the source of „moral degradation,' was at the core 
of this program……. The point here is that these initiatives remained 
essentially liberal in the sense that they took the form of specific state 
interventions to support citizens, specifically youth, to enable them to 
take control of their lives and become responsible and productive 
citizens. (p. 2) 
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Roberts (1978) critiques British government intervention in recreation 
and sport on three grounds. First, that it is unrealistic for the state to anticipate 
and provide for a large and growing demand for varying activities. Second, 
that governments base their decisions on which activities to support on 
subjective judgements often unsupported by sound evidence. Third, that the 
self-determined nature of recreation behaviour makes state intervention ad 
hoc at best. 
Roberts also points out, however, that the government sets the stage 
on which individuals make their own recreation and sport decisions relating to 
participating. For example, the state makes provision for access to land and 
education that may increase the type of activities individuals engage in. The 
New Zealand government administers the nation‟s conservation estate, not 
only for conservation purposes but to enable citizens to have access to 
recreation in the outdoors. At the local level, the maintenance of playing fields 
from ratepayer funds creates an unintended advantage to those sports using 
outdoor playing areas. Considerable sums of public money from national 
taxpayer and local ratepayer sources often underwrite major regional sports 
facilities. 
Sport policymakers must also describe the external benefits which 
government may be trying to elicit from greater sport participation. For 
example, the cost-benefit perceived from greater amounts of physical activity 
leading to improved health and welfare status for the wider population has 
proved elusive. Such linkages are not well supported in research and, like 
many public policy decisions, require a significant leap of faith. For example, 
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sport participation may be an observable factor in reducing anti-social 
behaviour and offending by young people. However, not all non-participants 
will offend or behave antic socially. It may be that the overwhelming majority 
of offenders do not play sport, but the link to reduced anti-social behaviour, 
although clear, may not be causative. 
In New Zealand during the 1950s, the government acknowledged 
recreation and sport as a legitimate public policy arena, but had little 
experience of working with sport NGOs. At a much earlier point in the 1930s, 
the British government acknowledged the role of recreation and sport NGO 
umbrella bodies such as the Central Council for Physical Training and 
Recreation through legislation (Henry, 1993, 24). The physical welfare 
approach now adopted by New Zealand would remain unchanged until the 
early 1970s. 
Government‟s involvement in the sport sector remained focused on a 
paradigm expressed through the physical welfare legislation. Sport 
participation remained, in government‟s eyes, a matter of private choice not 
requiring government interference. As the 1960s drew to a close, however, 
momentum grew in New Zealand to follow patterns set by other western 
democracies to take sport more seriously as a public policy issue. 
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Chapter Three - 1973-1983: The Ministry and Council 
for Recreation and Sport 
This chapter discusses the Recreation and Sport Act in 1973, 
establishing a clear government commitment to the sport sector with its own 
minister and ministry. When Joe Walding became the first minister for 
recreation and sport in 1973, the new Labour government under Prime 
Minister Kirk delivered on its 1972 manifesto which undertook to establish, for 
the first time, a minister for the sector and a sport portfolio located within DIA 
(New Zealand Labour Party, 192, 12). 3 The Act also set up a government-run 
Council for Recreation and Sport, the first manifestation of a formal 
government agency for sport set up at arms length from a core government 
department. 
The issue of who speaks for the sport sector re-emerged as the sector 
experienced the impact of a Council for Recreation and Sport appointed by 
the minister. The council advised the minister on the expenditure of 
government funds to benefit the recreation and sport sector. The question of 
who spoke for the sport sector as a whole in a possible discussion about what 
might benefit the sector the most, however, remained unanswered. But for the 
first time since the passing of the 1937 Physical Welfare Act, politicians 
articulated a rationale for government intervention in the sector. The passing 
of the Recreation and Sport Act was the last time politicians disagreed 
 
3
 A complete list of New Zealand ministers of sport can be found at Appendix A. 
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significantly across party lines about committing government funding to sport. 
This chapter also examines the genesis of difficult relationships between DIA 
and the Council for Recreation and Sport. In the context of a potential 
government sport policy for New Zealand, the lack of an explicit sport policy 
today, has its origins in these difficulties.4  
The post war period saw little change in government‟s commitment to 
the sport sector but by the early 1970s, leading figures in the sport were 
lobbying the National government and the Labour opposition to assist New 
Zealand sport to follow the international trend of government support for sport. 
Stothart (1977, 71) notes the Labour party‟s support for legendary athletics 
coach Arthur Lydiard‟s call for a ministry of sport and culture. The National 
government, however, had no intention of supporting the Labour 
government‟s actions to support sport. This became clear during debates on 
the 1972 recreation and sport bill when the National party‟s Alan Highet (now 
in opposition and a former minister of internal affairs) said “At first glance, it 
confirms my personal worst fears that the Government intends interfering in 
the administration of sport” (OCHR, 1972, p. 799). His colleague Harold 
Lapwood went further, “This socialistic administration is hoaxing the people 
into believing they are gong to receive all sorts of largesse” (Ibid. p. 1296). 
The opposition followed two particular lines of argument. Highet argued 
for a strengthening of DIA‟s capacity in its existing role (OCHR, 1973, p. 800) 
and Downie (the opposition member for Pakuranga) promoted the newly 
 
4
 By the 1990s „ministries‟ had responsibility for the development of government policy and 
„departments‟ had responsibility for the implementation of policies. In the 1970s, however, 
those distinctions were less clear and policies emerged from both ministries and departments. 
Quangos (and more recently, Crown entities) did not have a policy development 
responsibility. 
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formed New Zealand Sports Federation arguing for “representation from 
sporting bodies” (Ibid.).  
From 1973 onwards, as discussed later on, the recreation and sport 
portfolio budget remained small and under the control of DIA. Only much later 
on in the early 2000s did parliament allocate very large sums to sport rising to 
$70 million in 2007/2008. 
Walding, like William Parry in 1937, enthusiastically advocated for sport 
and the need for specific legislation to underpin the new portfolio. In 1972, he 
promoted a recreation and sport bill which parliament passed into law in 1973.  
The Act provided for the establishment of a ministry of recreation and sport 
and a council of recreation and sport both located within DIA. The Act also 
provided for DIA to fund and support the Council for Recreation and Sport, as 
an „arms length‟ body to provide the minister with advice on policies and 
programmes relating to recreation and sport in New Zealand (Stothart, 1976, 
75). 
The government‟s annual budget round now included a specific 
allocation for sport administered by DIA. This split of responsibility between a 
portfolio‟s activities and the administration of the funds is not unusual. DIA has 
a long history of administering a range of portfolios and answering to multiple 
ministers for portfolio results. In this case, DIA accounted to Walding for the 
results of its work in recreation and sport, but answered to the minister of 
internal affairs for its use of funds.5 DIA‟s responsibilities to the minister of 
 
5
 In 2008, The Department of Internal Affairs has its own Minister, and accounts also to the 
Ministers of Racing, Local Government, Community and Voluntary Sector, Ethnic Affairs, and 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management.  
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internal affairs took priority as it concerned the minister‟s direct accountability 
to parliament for all of DIA‟s funding, including that allocated to recreation and 
sport.  
The Labour party manifesto prior to the 1972 general election and the 
subsequent process of passing the legislation, provides a sense of how 
government justified the need for legislation. The manifesto announced that 
the Labour party would “establish a Ministry of Sport, responsible for the 
promotion of physical and mental health and the encouragement of a more 
meaningful use of leisure for all New Zealanders” (New Zealand Labour Party, 
1972, 12). Interestingly, while the Act‟s title specified „recreation‟ and „sport‟ it 
adopted the term „leisure‟ as a catch-all for both areas, the term „sport‟ 
received no definition in the Act. This apparent oversight, perhaps reflected a 
general perception amongst politicians that everyone knew what sport was 
and it therefore needed no definition. 
Coincidently, the establishment of post-graduate qualifications in 
recreation administration at Victoria and Lincoln Universities from 1977 
onwards, set the scene for a growing influence of professionals and 
academics in the area of recreation who were concerned to see a wider 
interpretation of recreation and to reduce the perceived dominance of the 
sport sector. Moreover, community funding schemes (including those run by 
DIA) covered more than just „sport‟. Submissions from DIA to the select 
committee supported the inclusion of „recreation‟ in both the title and ambit of 
the bill. 
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Precisely what the Labour government meant by “a more meaningful 
use of leisure” remained unclear throughout the passage of the bill through 
select committee. However, the connection between activity and improved 
community health status (both physical and mental) was implicit in the select 
committee discussions, in the subtext of submissions and in the parliamentary 
debate. Joe Walding (OCHR, 1973), the bill‟s promoter summed up his leaps 
of faith in the bill‟s first reading. 
It can be amply demonstrated that social costs do accrue from the 
neglect and recreational and sporting pursuits. The cost of indifference 
is felt at the community level in the cost of providing more and more 
medical services, the cost of loss of production arising from illness and 
the cost of social and criminal acts caused by frustration and boredom. 
(p. 1256) 
Labour based its policy logic on the potential for a population more 
involved in sport leading to useful results or public benefits. The implied 
benefits included reduced health and welfare costs to the taxpayer and 
building social cohesion or stronger communities. Nonetheless, the precise 
mechanism underpinning these assumptions remained unstated by either the 
bill‟s proponents or the select committee. Nor is there any evidence that any 
government agency presented data which supported links between 
participation in recreation and sport and medical service provision, loss of 
industrial production or reducing the cost of crime. 
This continued a pattern of previous years in which government 
involvement in recreation and sport lacked supporting policy work. Throughout 
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the passage of the bill, DIA officials undertook no analysis of potential social 
benefits accrued following the setting up of a publicly funded agency for sport. 
This lack of analysis based on relevant and accurate evidence continued a 
characteristic of the earlier 1937 legislation and subsequent government 
programmes. 
High standards of evidence underpin robust policy advice. Former 
secretary to the Treasury, Graham Scott (2001, 351)) observes: “there should 
be healthy debate and constructive tension on controversial subjects, 
especially when the need to address them first arises. Easton (2002) 
comments: “At the heart of any [policy] solution is how well the problem is 
addressed.” Throughout the 20th century, government funding of sport lacked 
any such analysis, even at the crucial stage of enacting relevant legislation. 
Members of the select committee expressed strong views for and 
against the bill. National opposition members reiterated the thrust of MPs 
Highet and Lapwood cited earlier, whilst government members reiterated 
Walding„s comments when in opposition that “his party would help 
organisations, not dictate to them” (Stothart, 1977, 72). In particular, 
recreation and sport NGOs were concerned about the impact of explicit 
recreation and sport legislation on their activities. This should have been a 
clear signal to the government that the success of the policy design for 
government intervention in sport would turn on the co-operation of sport 
NGOs. In its select committee submission, the national YMCA was clear: 
The power conferred on the Council [for Recreation and Sport] 
….makes very real the danger of the growth of a state-based 
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recreational service. Such a development would be detrimental to such 
important elements in our way of life as community self-help, initiative 
and involvement. (Department of Internal Affairs, 1973). 
Joe Walding (OCHR, 1973) as promoter of the bill countered with the 
comment that: 
I cannot accept the proposition that assistance which the Government 
intends to make available through the Ministry of Recreation and Sport 
will in any way erode the spirit of self-help or the autonomy of sporting 
organisations in this country. (p. 1257) 
When pressed on this issue, Walding (Ibid.) went further: 
To the best of my knowledge it has never been seriously suggested 
that these grants have in any way impinged the traditional freedom of 
such organisations [sport NGOs]. Would anyone suggest that the 
subsidy of $300,000 granted yesterday to the Commonwealth Games 
Organisation will impinge on its independence? (p. 1257) 
By the third reading of the bill, however, Labour gained muted cross-
party support. The National party‟s Lance Adams-Schneider “…..It will 
certainly receive at least qualified support from the opposition” (Ibid. p. 1260). 
In a similar vein to the YMCA, the newly-formed Federation of Sport 
voiced its concern to the select committee that the absence of sporting 
representatives on the proposed New Zealand Council for Recreation and 
Sport was likely to lead to state-control of sport (Buckingham, Brockwell & 
Wells, 1972). 
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Auckland sport administrator John Buckingham revived the idea of a 
voice for sport. Almost single-handedly he formed the federation in 1972. The 
initiative lacked a strong mandate from the sport sector, however, and the 
government chose to ignore the federation‟s submission. The New Zealand 
Association of Health, Physical Education and Recreation (NZAHPER), 
however, had a different view to that of the federation and saw in the 
establishment of a council, an opportunity to better inform government policy 
relating to recreation and sport in the community. NZAHPER argued that the 
proposed council should comprise people widely qualified by experience and 
training and not only sportsmen who have gained national or international 
honours (Brough, Laidler & Stothart, 1972). Given the eventual counciI 
membership, it seems likely that NZAHPER‟s views, as a well-established 
recreation and sport professional body, obtained some traction. In the same 
submission, NZAHPER also proposed that the proposed ministry be located 
within the department of education, echoing the earlier PSC report 
recommendations. 
The Recreation and Sport Act achieved three important milestones. 
First, that the government now had the power to direct tax-payer funds 
towards the development of recreation and sport organisations. This 
acquisition of power was a change from the 1937 legislation which did not 
make such a provision. For the first time, the new legislation formally 
acknowledged the relevance of sport NGOs to implementing the legislation. 
Second, establishing the council for recreation and sport, put in place a 
central national level structure, mandated by government to support sport 
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NGOs. Thirdly, and for the first time, „recreation‟ enjoyed a legislative 
definition. 
While Walding intended the new legislation to support the efforts of 
recreation and sport NGOs, it is not clear to what extent, if at all, any 
departmental policy development work leading to the Act took account of 
NGO aspirations and recognised them in the design of its implementation. 
Submissions to the select committee did not led to significant changes in the 
bill prior to its final reading in parliament and the sport sector, in any case, had 
no means of expressing a unified position on the new legislation‟s potential 
impact on sport. 
The Act proposed a government-controlled funding mechanism or, at 
the very least, a mechanism guided by the new council‟s mandate. For sport 
NGOs, this was a first taste of government accountability requirements and 
the start of a contest between the NGOs for access to government funds. 
Throughout the next thirty years, demand always exceeded supply in this 
contest. Funded NGOs received no guidance from the council as to 
government‟s policy motivation for providing funding support and what might 
be expected in return. Since 1973, no evidence exists that sport NGOs as a 
group or sector ever „bought into‟ a shared policy goal of better community 
health and welfare. Rather than promoting or working towards „buy in‟, 
successive governments‟ approach to funding has focused on two main 
issues. First, accountability for public funds and ensuring the presence of 
audit trails for the use of those funds. Second, an apparent desire to influence 
the way the sport sector operates. While the latter focus seems innocuous, it 
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sits at the heart of long-standing government efforts support or build the 
capacity of the non-profit sector. For example, the publication of resources to 
assist sport NGOs to improve their capacity to manage themselves better or 
to have strategic plans following „business‟ planning practice and 
implementing business management approaches.  
With few financial resources at is disposal, the Council for Recreation and 
Sport decided to promote participation in sport as a healthy option for all 
citizens through a publicity campaign Come Alive. The council made a few 
attempts to bring parts of the sport sector together in order to address some 
aspects of sector development. For instance, in 1977, the council convened a 
first conference of national sports coaches in Wellington. Not until the 
appointment of a part-time sport advisor in 1981, however, did the council 
have any capacity to focus its attention directly to sport. The council did not 
attempt to bring sport NGOs together as a sector to discuss and agree a 
strategy for sector. Government‟s priorities for recreation and sport are not 
necessarily those of sport NGOs. Governments set very high level goals for 
all of society. For instance, the 2005-2008 Labour government adopted three 
themes to which government agencies anchored their planning: 
 Families young and old 
 Economic transformation 
 National identity. 
In the early 1970s, the new Labour government had social policy goals of 
improved public health, housing, social security and education. Departments 
were not required, however, to show in planning and reporting documents 
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how their budget expenditure contributed to those goals. Accordingly, 
narrower government sector goals such as those for sport remained unstated. 
As mentioned earlier, government broadly sheeted home its intervention in 
sport to implied benefits to the tax payer of reduced health and welfare costs 
and building social cohesion. 
There are no practical state alternatives, however, to a national sport 
delivery system. Sport participation is a matter of private choice and its 
governance and management are matters for citizens. Government policy 
goals for sport must take into account policy implementation. Government 
must align its public policy goals with those of the sector engaged in the 
implementation of policy, in this case the sport sector. Harmonising such 
goals required meaningful engagement and discussion on joint interests and 
the impact of alignment on the sport sector. Such engagement did not occur 
then, nor does it now.  
For the latter half of the twentieth century and into the twenty first century, 
New Zealand governments failed to work meaningfully with the sport NGOs to 
develop policy goals. Access to government funding, however, was based on 
the primacy of achieving government‟s goals first and the sport sector‟s 
contribution to those outcomes. This became a hallmark of the relationship 
between successive government agencies for recreation and sport, and sport 
NGOs for the next 30 years.  
The 1973 Act required the minister to appoint 11 council members 
including the chair and in that year, Walding appointed prominent Wellington 
senior magistrate, Des Sullivan as chair of the first council. The membership 
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(Appendix B) showed a wide spread of recreation and sport interests, but only 
one member (Lance Cross) carried a formal mandate from the sport sector. 
As chair of the New Zealand OIympic and Commonwealth Games Association 
(NZOCGA), Lance Cross represented the interests of over 40 sport NGOs. 
The NZOCGA‟s focus, however, rested on commissioning of teams to 
Olympic and Commonwealth Games rather than the wider development 
interests of sport. Cross was an established member of the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) with a strong personal focus on his work in the 
international arena. Some in the sport sector of the time were less enamoured 
of Cross considering him an ineffective advocate for the interests of sport. (R. 
A. Stothart, personal communication, June 19, 2007). IOC members act in the 
IOC‟s interest not the interests of their country of origin and Cross‟s IOC 
commitments may have taken priority over domestic sport system issues. The 
„voice for sport‟ issue simmered for many years, finally emerging in late1982 
as discussed later. 
By the end of 1975 due to retirements and a change to a National-led 
government, the council membership changed significantly (Appendix B). 
Beyond Lance Cross, however, and given the minister‟s power over 
appointments to the council, the sport sector still lacked a formal voice on the 
council right up to the time government finally disbanded it in 1987.  
Membership of the first and subsequent councils typified many 
government committees of the time. Ministers made their appointments with 
an eye to achieving representative balance in respect of the sport sector, 
gender and geography. Issues of representativeness confront all governments 
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when appointing such committees. Inevitably, not all interests gain 
representation during inquiry processes. The key issue for such public inquiry 
processes is whether all „voices‟ have the opportunity to be heard and 
considered.  
In contemporary writing on public policy development, the issue of public 
participation has emerged as a critical manifestation of strong democracies 
(Carson & Hartz-Kamp, 2005, 120; Gezci, 2007, 376). The ability of those 
affected by policy decisions to participate in the development of policy is 
considered a „good thing‟ (Richardson, 1983, 52). The lack of formal sport 
sector participation in the development of council programmes and 
representation on the council remained a „bone of contention‟ with the sector 
for many years. 
The Recreation and Sport Act 1973 clearly laid out the council‟s functions. 
They were to: 
 foster and promote the total well-being of and fullest use of leisure by 
the residents of New Zealand 
 advise the Minister of Recreation and Sport on any matters relating to 
recreation and sport 
 investigate developments in recreation and sport, and disseminate 
knowledge and information about such developments.” (Recreation 
and Sport Act 1973, s.19). 
These high-level functions provided the council with a mandate to take 
whatever approach it chose without formal reference to the sector. The 
establishment of the council as a high-level quango provided a much clearer 
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point of contact for the recreation and sport sector than had existed before. To 
some extent, the council became a „lightning rod‟ for resource issues affecting 
the sector (particularly funding) and helped politicise the wider sport sector. 
Prior to this time, political acts relating to sport in New Zealand tended to 
focus on high profile international sports activities, especially involving rugby 
relations with apartheid South Africa. Subsequent events redrew the 
boundaries between sport and politics when in 1980 the Muldoon government 
demanded that the NZOCGA withdraw from the Moscow Olympiad. 
In the council‟s early years, sport NGOs applied directly to the council for 
funding. In 1975, government granted the council $283,692 to distribute as it 
saw fit. By 1982 funding levels had risen to just $328,820, 38% of which 
($215,000) sourced from the newly established New Zealand Lotteries 
Board.6 Unfortunately, management and programme delivery costs absorbed 
the majority of the annual budget. In 1982, therefore, only a paltry $84,812 
was available for distribution to individual sports. 
Despite its limited funds, the council needed support staff and DIA 
provided administration services to the council in the form of a chief advisor, 
advisors for leadership training and outdoor recreation, and promotions officer 
along with secretarial support.7 A much better resourced DIA, however, ran a 
national projects scheme funded at $1.2 million annually for the 10 years from 
1975-195. In addition, a local and community development scheme for sport, 
 
6
 Following the enacting of the Lotteries Act in 1998, the Lotteries Board was renamed as the 
Lottery Grants Board (LGB) 
7
 The Council‟s first professional staff appointees were: Bob Stothart (leadership training), 
Bob Larkin (chief advisor), Colin Abbott (outdoor recreation) and Bruce Stokell (promotions 
and publicity). 
 58 
recreation, the arts, community development totalled $3.4 million in 
1983/1984 (Department of Internal Affairs, 1984, 47). 
The council‟s NGO funding programme prioritised support for core 
administration costs, leadership and facilities, rather than to high performance 
sport. The irony of this will not be lost on today‟s NGOs from all sectors as 
they struggle to persuade government funders of the essential nature of such 
costs. (Unwin, 2005; Whale, 2005). Moreover, sport NGOs had no say in or 
input to the distribution of funds to sport directed through local committees via 
the council‟s local scheme. The local committees had no obligation to consult 
with national sport administrators and had broad terms of reference in relation 
to what could and would be locally-funded. NGOs disliked the latter process 
and it provided an early signal to a long period of tension between the 
government funder and the sport sector over the key elements of any funding 
strategy. In particular, the issue of prioritisation and a focus on core costs 
versus high performance sport (Stothart, 1976, 76). 
Despite the advent of a dedicated ministry and a council, both had lean 
organisational arrangements and attracted few significant costs. DIA officials 
staffed the new and small ministry‟s staff as a business unit of the department 
rather than a separate organisation in its own right. The minister received 
independent advice from ministry staff which also provided administration 
support to the council. This represented an early manifestation of ministers 
receiving a separate advice stream from departments as well as from the 
quango overseen by the same department and the potential for tensions to 
arise between the quango and department. In this case, if disagreements 
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arose between the council and ministry, the ministry was at an advantage 
over the council. The secretary for internal affairs sat on the council as of right 
representing the government‟s „ownership‟ interest in the quango. Thus, the 
ministry knew the council‟s advice to the minister but the reverse was not 
always the case.  
These arrangements were and remain typical of today‟s „quangos‟ now 
known as crown entities. The rigours of parliamentary oversight applied to 
departments are not easily applied to arms length agencies (Scott, 2001, 
178). Moreover, their reasons for existence change with shifts in government 
policy over time. Government „owns‟ crown entities and the difficulty in 
managing their accountabilities became more worrying for government from 
the late 1970s to the 1990s. Placing them at arms length (like the council for 
recreation and sport) provides more flexibility for their work than core 
departments. Their responsible ministers have rights to direct their actions, 
however, if such actions seem contrary to government policy. Ministers, DIA 
and the council had a limited understanding of how their relationship might 
play out. By the 1990s, these relationship issues were more widely 
acknowledged. In Scott‟s words: 
A lack of structure and principle in the way these rights are exercised can 
diffuse responsibility and accountability and even debilitate an 
organisation. It also affects the credibility and reputations of the 
organisation and the policy it serves. (p. 271) 
As a consequence of having oversight of the council (and subsequent 
funding agencies), the department built an institutional memory for the 
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portfolio which provided an opportunity for ministers to receive better 
contestable policy advice in future years as the crown entities changed.  
Parliament allocated funding to the ministry via Vote: Internal Affairs which 
supported the portfolio in four ways (Recreation and Sport Act 1973, S.3). 
First, it funded the council, second, it administered the recreation and sport 
subsidy schemes already mentioned in this chapter, and third, delivered 
regional planning and advisory services through officials based in Auckland, 
Rotorua, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin. Its fourth task was the 
provision of contestable policy advice to the Minister of Recreation and Sport, 
a new development, not just for Internal Affairs, but for many departments 
which had responsibility for administering arms-length organisations 
(quangos). Up to that point, departments were responsible for developing both 
policy and the means of implementation. In the case of recreation and sport, 
there was no high-level policy document. Inevitably, the role of the Council, 
seemingly clear in the Act, became muddled with that of the Department. A 
national policy could have guided both the Ministry and Council and avoided 
the tensions which emerged between the two.  
Although the ministry comprised over 10 staff, only three were 
professionally qualified and the lack of a clear government recreation and 
sport policy undermined the department‟s commitment to the portfolio. 
Moreover, a later review of the council in 1983 noted that most of those 
officials were appointed at a clerical level with few, if any, significant policy 
advice responsibilities. These officials were located in the recreation and 
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community development unit which fell under the broad ambit of DIA‟s 
recreation, arts and youth division. 
The ministry aligned its goals and priorities closely with those of the 
department rather than having separate goals and strategic plans. From a 
public management perspective this is unsurprising. Ministry management 
reporting lines followed the department‟s structure and all funds accounted for 
via departmental accounts. Such nuanced relationships mean much to state 
servants but little to citizens and to NGOs who see a minister and ministry as 
being jointly focused on their [NGOs‟] core business and are not concerned 
about the niceties of public sector accountability and reporting lines.  
The ministry therefore aligned its purpose with the department‟s goals 
of supporting and fostering the well-being of communities (Garrett, 1978, 62). 
The department already distributed grants to community organisations, local 
authorities, and to schools. Most of DIA‟s grant-making programmes by-
passed sport NGOs directing funds through local vehicles such as local 
government. The ministry‟s funding activities were not new initiatives. In fact 
they were entirely consistent with the department‟s recent history of 
grantmaking. The new ministry derived its initial staffing complement from the 
youth activities branch of the department (set up following the demise of the 
physical welfare branch in the 1960s). It was not surprising that, in the 
absence of any new policy programme, youth activities branch staff continued 
to undertake a „business as usual‟ approach but as members of a re-
organised team within the department. The branch also had officers in the 
four main cities across New Zealand tasked with developing recreation 
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activities for young people. (Garrett, 1978). Clearly, this lack of co-ordination 
between DIA‟s youth activities branch and the council advantaged the better-
resourced DIA but compromised any overall benefit of having a dedicated 
council. 
The 1972 Labour government had only lasted one term and the 
incoming National government cut funding to the council. This was not 
unexpected in the context of National‟s efforts to rein in a substantial budget 
deficit (Martin, 2006, 81). To that point, central government based its 
allocation of public funds to local authorities for local initiatives on 70 cents 
per head of population, an increase from 50 cents in 1974/1975. The new 
government cut the fund back to 50 cents. The 40% cut had an immediate 
impact, severely restricting local government‟s grant-making activities to any 
activities including sport. With government encouragement, the council 
discontinued Come Alive, its flagship programme encouraging participation in 
sport. Stothart (1980, 48) considers that the programme successfully 
established the council‟s presence on the recreation and sport landscape, but 
Come Alive was too closely aligned with the Labour government‟s programme 
to survive. 
During this period, government-appointed bodies to carry out specific 
tasks rather than using core government departments were commonplace. 
These bodies proliferated to over 1,200 by the early 1980s. Although not 
government departments as such, „quasi national (or non-) governmental 
organisations‟ or „quangos‟ became a recognisable part of the public sector 
landscape. Ministers appointed the members of these bodies to undertake 
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tasks which ministers felt could not be achieved as well by the core public 
service. Little evidence exists that governments actually evaluated the quango 
structure. By 1979, however, a growing unease existed within the public 
sector that the rationale for many quangos would not bear scrutiny. Indeed, 
their accountabilities were, at best, loose and at their worst, insufficient for 
government purposes (Palmer, 1979, 168-169). It was in this setting that the 
Council encountered the first significant challenge to its existence. 
In 1982, the National government directed the SSC to review all quangos 
and to advise the government on whether the bodies under review still served 
a useful purpose and whether they should remain. The SSC‟s terms of 
reference also asked it to look specifically at matters of efficiency and 
effectiveness and, in particular, the council‟s funding arrangements (State 
Services Commission, 1983, 3). 
Prue Hyman, chair of the Victoria University of Wellington economics 
department, headed the team to review the council for recreation and sport. 
The panel also comprised John Roseveare (SSC) and Conal Townsend (DIA) 
and met for the first time on 1 December 1982. The review addressed five 
possible roles for a central government agency or quango to support 
government intervention in recreation and sport. These roles were: 
 Helping individuals and groups to help themselves through the 
provision of funds, expertise, information and educational opportunities 
 Influencing the community to a fuller use of leisure 
 Influencing the Government and government agencies to appreciate 
the importance of recreation and sport 
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 Providing policy advice to the Government 
 Encouraging individual and community growth through recreation (p.3). 
The review committee consulted the sport sector widely, receiving written 
submissions and conducting many interviews. The committee was aware of 
the damaged relationship between the council and ministry and set out to 
address that problem specifically. 
The review concluded that a failure of the ministry to achieve a shared 
understanding of the council‟s direction and goals constrained the council‟s 
effectiveness and vice versa. The committee highlighted practical matters 
such as inadequate time in meetings to address policy issues, a narrow range 
of contact across the recreation and sport sector, and the council‟s failure to 
prioritise its research funding (State Services Commission, 1983, 5). 
Moreover, the review concluded that due mainly to a poor working relationship 
the council and ministry failed to co-ordinate their efforts. 
The review paid considerable attention to DIA and, specifically, to the 
ministry‟s function within the department. Although the reviewers did not 
report their reasons for addressing this function, there are two possibilities. 
The committee certainly wished to understand what it perceived as a 
dysfunctional relationship between the ministry and council. This perception 
emerged in the context of the broader SSC quango review which sought to 
examine more closely the linkages between quangos and their responsible 
departments. A second possibility is that the committee responded to disquiet 
within the sport sector about an apparent overlap between the roles of the 
council and the department and further, that the government was attempting 
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to exert undue influence over the sector (Ministry of Recreation and Sport, 
1984, 31). A further possibility also existed although not canvassed by the 
review. While the council was clearly an off-shoot of the department, the 
department‟s own priorities and approach to recreation and sport policy may 
have distracted the ministry staff from direct engagement with sport NGOs. It 
seems likely that in effect, all these factors played a part in the final 
recommendations from the committee. 
The Hyman Committee made no references in its report to the role 
played by either the ministry or council in following a specific government 
recreation and sport policy. Instead, its conclusions focused on the lack of 
clear direction for and by the council and the fractious nature of the 
relationship between the council and ministry. By implication, it signalled the 
lack of a policy direction as a problem. The committee remained silent on the 
impact of powerful individuals on the council. Sir Ron Scott and Sir Lance 
Scott were influential within government circles. Given their already poor 
opinion of the ministry, it is likely that they had little confidence in a public-
sector driven review process. 
The council-ministry relationship was closely examined by Garret 
(1982, 62) in his analysis of the politics that lay behind government‟s sport 
bureaucracy. Garrett exemplified this tension as one based on an imbalance 
of power between the council and ministry and cites a 1976 council meeting 
minute. 
The role of the Council dominates the Act, whereas the function of the 
Ministry is covered in one short clause. However, progressively over 
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the years, through initiative and to some degree, circumstance, the 
roles have been reversed, and today the Ministry dominates the day to 
day operation, is responsible for almost all the money, while full 
Council meets merely to rubber stamp Executive decisions in which the 
Ministry has had a powerful input. (New Zealand Council for Recreation 
and Sport, 1976). 
As well as tensions between the council and sport NGOs, tensions 
between the council and ministry grew quickly. The two agencies had a 
relationship founded on unbalanced information flows where ministry officials 
advised the minister with the benefit of knowing the council‟s advice to the 
minister. The privilege did not appear, however, to flow in the opposite 
direction. This information asymmetry emerged as an unintended 
consequence of having quangos in the first place. From the early days of their 
establishment as a public management tool, governments paid little attention 
to the balance between quangos getting work done, a minister‟s need for 
good policy advice from his or her department and the role of that department 
in undertaking its administrative oversight of the quango in question.  
Accordingly, the council often felt undermined by the ministry. In effect, 
the lack of clarity around the accountability of the two players seems the most 
likely core problem. As noted above, the council‟s accountability for 
performance was unclear as were the hundreds of other quangos. The 
ministry‟s accountability for performance in meeting its recreation and sport 
responsibilities became subsumed within the complex and diverse functions 
of the department. Again, the lack of a sport policy against which to report 
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either the ministry‟s or the council‟s performance provided no comfort to sport 
NGOs that government recognised their interests. 
The incoming Labour government in 1984 committed itself to reducing 
the number of quangos and to bringing more accountability to those that 
remained. It was within this environment that the era of the Council for 
Recreation and Sport came to a close (Palmer & Palmer, 1997, 168). 
The accountability of quangos bedevilled many core government 
departments. Like other departments, DIA reported on the council‟s 
performance as a quango under its oversight. In addition, the ministry‟s own 
accountabilities to the Parliament via the responsible minister were also 
uncertain as it formed part of DIA‟s overall performance. Palmer (1979) 
observed: 
It is time to get rid of the system whereby the minister is, in theory, 
accountable for everything and in practice, accountable for very little. 
We should move towards a system whereby the officials are publicly 
answerable for the responsibilities delegated to them by Cabinet. A 
new system of public accountability should be introduced. (p. 35) 
While these changes took their course, in 1983 two further phenomena 
entered the recreation and sport landscape. First, sport NGOs became 
increasingly vocal in lobbying for a sport sector-led organisation to act as „a 
voice for sport‟. Graeme Brockett a Christchurch-based sport administrator 
spoke bluntly on the matter at a council seminar on the future of sport in New 
Zealand: 
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…..sport in New Zealand has not had a voice or parliament of sport 
whereby sports people can express their views and determine the way 
in which sport and I think recreation in New Zealand should 
develop…….In New Zealand we seem to be working very much in our 
own sectional groups and interests.” (New Zealand Council for 
Recreation and Sport, 1982, 45) 
Many sport administrators supported Brockett‟s comments. He went on 
to say: 
Although an attempt was made in the 1970s to form a federation of 
sport [there was then] the question of funding. When government came 
in, [its] policy was to establish a council of recreation and sport where 
the members were nominated by the Minister. Sport did not have a 
voice.” (p. 45) 
Influential athletics administrator, Ian Boyd lent his weight to Brockett‟s central 
idea “I go along with the idea of setting up a group of people to pursue the 
idea of one voice in sport….. we must have that strong voice.” (p. 46) 
Second, pressure grew on government from many quarters to 
introduce a state-sponsored lottery to fund sport, recreation, the arts and 
other community projects (Grant, 1994, 249). During the next decade, the new 
lottery, Lotto, became the source of major funding to New Zealand sport 
NGOs. 
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Chapter Four – 1984: ‘Sport On The Move’ 
The incoming Labour government in 1984 undertook to review the 
ministry and council. This chapter comments on two results of that review, its 
report Sport on the Move, and government‟s response to the report, the 
establishment of a new funding agency, the Hillary Commission. The chapter 
pays special attention to the sport sector‟s involvement in the review. and the 
impact of public sector reforms which sought to bring stronger accountability 
arrangements to bear on its arms length organisations outside core 
departments such as the commission. The state lottery, Lotto, created a new 
and large funding pool for sport. The Hillary Commission‟s administration of 
those funds reflected shifts in public policy thinking about accountability. The 
commission did not provide the sport policy framework, however, originally 
sought by the 1984 review. This chapter looks at the effect on sport NGOs of 
the new funding environment. The chapter closes with commentary on the 
government‟s decision to change the legislation and move the commission 
away from funding a wide range of recreation pastimes from floral arranging 
to sport, and to focus exclusively of sport. The legislative process revealed 
some of the policy thinking behind that decision and the extent of sport‟s 
involvement.  
When the minister of sport, Mike Moore appointed the sport 
development inquiry committee in December 1984, to report on priorities for 
developing sport in New Zealand, government‟s objectives for sport still 
remained unclear (Ministry of Recreation and Sport, 1985, 13). One specific 
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goal for the committee was to propose roles for central, regional and local 
government in the way they supported sport. The committee met for the first 
time early in March 1984 and over the following five months considered 218 
written submissions and 60 oral presentations. 
 
The inquiry did not commence its work, however, with a specific 
problem to overcome. In its background papers, the committee had a list of 
broad issues in mind, which reflected dissatisfaction with the council for 
recreation and sport and its relationship with the ministry (R. A Stothart, 
personal communication, June 19, 2007). Concerns that the state education 
system failed to provide a strong foundation for the national sport system 
headed that list. The national sport system as it existed at the time consisted 
of a loose conglomeration of NGOs, coaches and scientists. Formal links 
between the sporting codes and schools were few and ad hoc. Most sport 
NGOs of the time had only sufficient resources to meet their own domestic 
needs let alone, building strategic alliances across the sector or with the 
education system. 
The background papers also returned to the long-standing theme of 
New Zealanders‟ physical fitness. Some commentators perceived young 
people as unfit, girls particularly, along with propositions that many young 
people had poor learning of basic movement skills such as running, jumping 
and throwing. 
Moore also widened the Committee‟s brief to encompass many of the 
issues now common in modern national sport inquiries. There was evidence 
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of illegal drug use amongst elite athletes along with perceptions of increasing 
levels of sport violence. Some commentators observed that society continued 
to undervalue women in sport and there had been reports of sport NGOs 
experiencing difficulties in accessing sports facilities of an acceptable 
standard.  
Most importantly, however, Moore expressed concern about the 
funding environment for sport at all levels, which he identified as unstable and 
mounting evidence of the previous National government‟s lack of commitment 
to funding sport. 
The committee‟s list of issues had been constructed from those raised 
by a range of advocacy groups including a strong lobby seeking more funding 
for sport. Senior sport administrators led this lobby, including Keith Hancox 
(Executive Director of NZSF), and Sir Ron Scott, a hugely influential figure in 
the years following his leadership of the 1974 Commonwealth Games as chair 
of the organising committee. Other lobbyists included physical education and 
recreation professionals who were concerned about issues such as physical 
activity in schools. Many believed that schools overemphasised sport and 
they advocated a broader recreation agenda (Ibid. 11). The committee itself 
comprised 10 members from across the recreation and sport spectrum, 
chaired by Scott (Ibid. 13). 
A four-person team led by a private consultant Geoff Henley serviced 
the inquiry committee. By moving the servicing arrangements away from a 
government department, the minister tried to convey the impression of a 
committee independent from government. The 2001 Sport, Fitness and 
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Leisure Ministerial Taskforce adopted a similar process making extensive use 
of independent servicing. 
Sam (2005, 78), observes that modern sport inquiry processes may be 
positive in the sense that they bring new issues and sector perspectives to the 
table in ways which the public service itself would find difficult. However, Sam 
also comments that the ideological context of the day will influence inquiries, 
effecting the terms of reference, means of reporting, and the level of 
resourcing. Government reviews are rarely „independent‟ in the sense that 
ministers usually appoint committee members, provide and seek 
accountability for the resourcing of such committees and control the results 
and publication of review findings. Only a few government agencies have 
clearly understood independence. Statutory or judicial powers usually 
underpin these agencies and in some instances, such as the Office of the 
Auditor-General (OAG), they answer to the Speaker of the parliament rather 
than the government of the day.  
Sam‟s conclusions seem to understate the problem. Berry (2005, 568), 
concludes that in America, federal tax law constrains charities from 
advocating for their clients on policy process. In New Zealand, sport NGOs 
have been restrained or remained silent in their advocacy for sport policy 
issues. Despite having no formal mandate or authority to speak for the sport 
sector, influential figures such as Lance Cross and Ron Scott have, over time, 
carried great weight with government ministers. The omission of a formally 
mandated voice for sport in the membership of all government review groups 
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from 1937 to 2003 wittingly or unwittingly left the sector marginalised in what 
proved to be process and results critically important to the sector. 
At face value, it is hard to understand why sport NGOs have not been 
more aggressive in their lobbying of government. However, as the sport 
sector became increasingly dependent on government for funding, it seems 
likely that the sector was reluctant to “bite the hand that feeds it”. Government 
funders have been ambivalent about supporting advocacy as a specific 
activity (Ministry of Social Policy, 2001, 105). In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the Hillary Commission limited its funding for the New Zealand 
Assembly for Sport to a set of activities which benefited the commission rather 
than enabling the sector to develop a coherent voice on policy-related matters 
(New Zealand Assembly for Sport, 1989, F3). 
In 1984, the new Labour government distrusted the public service 
(Hensley, 2005, 129). The history of tension between DIA and the former 
Council for Recreation and Sport recounted in the previous chapter preceded 
the inquiry. That history would have been on Ron Scott‟s mind as a former 
council member when he interacted with minister Moore in the lead up to the 
inquiry. 
As with previous review committees, Moore‟s appointments appear, on 
first examination, to have been a fair cross-section of many sport sector 
interests. Moore did not, however, appoint an individual with a clear mandated 
„voice‟ for sport. Although sport NGOs formed the New Zealand Assembly for 
Sport in 1980, Moore chose not to include the assembly on the inquiry 
committee despite its membership of 87 national bodies. 
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Although a government-led inquiry, the committee made only passing 
reference in its final report, Sport on the Move, to the need for explicit sport 
policies. Having identified a series of benefits that sport made to society the 
committee observed that “new government policies for sport should seek to 
reinforce and extend these benefits and provide and national basis for future 
planning.” (p. 13) 
The committee concluded that the benefits to society from a strategic 
approach to sport fell into five areas: 
 personal and private benefits to the individual (improved self esteem, 
sense of purpose, sense of achievement and improved personal 
status) 
  physical competence benefits which accrue from gains in physical 
skills 
 social and moral benefits (improvements in integrity, teamwork, co-
operation, courage and honour) 
 gains in fitness and in health 
 improvements in human potential (individual efforts reinforcing and 
extending human capabilities). 
The committee made little reference in its report, to evidence supporting its 
conclusions regarding the benefits of sport. The report‟s bibliography focuses 
more on benefits of physical activity and exercise. As mentioned elsewhere in 
this study, research on the benefits of sport to society is mixed. Coalter‟s 2005 
Sport Scotland report on the social benefits of sport summarises the difficulty 
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in arriving at firm conclusions about this subject. His report identifies three 
problematic areas: 
 The lack of robust research in many of the current priority areas in 
social policy.  
 The difficulties in measuring many of the claimed effects of sports 
participation, and of separating them from other influences. For 
example, reduction in crime may not simply reflect the provision of 
sports programmes aimed at diverting young people from crime and 
anti-social behaviour, but a range of other policies or wider 
environmental improvements.  
 Many of sport‟s effects are indirect. For example, the belief that 
participation in sport reduces the propensity to commit crime is 
based on the assumption that this will be the outcome of such 
intermediate outcomes as increased self-esteem and self-discipline 
However, the measurement of cause and effect – between inputs 
and actual changes of behaviour – presents certain difficulties. (p. 
6) 
Coalter (2005) goes further. He refers to the benefits from sport 
participation claimed by many writers as “only a possibility” (p. 2). He 
suggests that the benefits only accrue when two critical characteristics are 
present. First, people must participate and second, their participation must 
meet criteria which have the greatest chance of achieving the desired 
outcome. The measurement of cause and effect is the primary difficulty in 
linking sport participation to any particular social benefit.  
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However, by the early 1980s, the New Zealand government had no 
particular policy position on its involvement in sport. The inquiry committee 
focused its attention instead on the need for a government-funded 
organisation to provide some form of direction and leadership. The committee 
did not favour a sector-wide representative body to act as a „voice‟ for sport 
concluding that such an organisation could become a “controlling” influence 
(Ministry of Recreation and Sport, 1984, 32). Instead, sport NGOs should 
have a “close, major and active role in the development of policy of any 
statutory body” (Ibid. 32). This is significant as government policy-making has 
always acknowledged the need to engage with the „stakeholders‟ in a given 
policy.  
In the absence of an umbrella advocacy body mandated by the sport 
sector, the inquiry committee needed a robust engagement process. Although 
the committee invited all interested parties to make submissions, thos 
submissions came only from individuals and specific sport NGOs. A unified 
voice for sport was not evident from the 218 submissions from individuals and 
organisations. This failure to engage the sector systematically, to enable the 
sport sector to debate a shared perspective and a lack of any feedback 
mechanisms ahead of the final report became a feature of future review 
processes. 
Ministers reacted positively to Sport on the Move and agreed to the 
proposal for a government organisation to provide funding and leadership for 
a national sport system. Within 2 months parliament passed new legislation 
(still entitled the Recreation and Sport Act), establishing the Hillary 
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Commission as the government recreation and sport organisation empowered 
to distribute funding and make strategic decisions about government‟s 
involvement in New Zealand sport (Recreation and Sport Act 1987, s.17). 
As noted in the previous chapter successive governments set up a 
multitude of arms-length organisations, such as the commission set up by to 
do work that they did not want core government departments to undertake. In 
1989, the Labour government‟s minister for justice, Geoffrey Palmer led the 
restructuring of these organisations or quangos to fit a more robust 
classification system. The new system re-classified government agencies 
which were not departments or ministries as crown entities. (Palmer, 1979 & 
Palmer and Palmer, 114). 
Quangos were decision-making bodies somewhat freed from the 
ministerial oversight which applied to departments. Ministers appointed 
quango board members, often without any form of transparency. The risks of 
political patronage were significant and few rules existed on how members of 
such boards were to be recruited. (Palmer, 1979 & Palmer and Palmer, 1997). 
In 1979, Palmer reported the existence of some “1,268 quangos comprising 
over 5,000 board or committee members” (p. 37). 
Governments set up arms-length organisations for many reasons. 
Generally designed to limit direct ministerial interference, they bring to 
government expertise not generally available in departments including people 
with specialist skills (such as sport administrators) to take a much greater part 
in government decision-making (Palmer & Palmer, 1992). 
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In line with Sport on the Move’s recommendations, membership of the 
Hillary Commission was intended to provide the impression of an independent 
organisation committed to sport with a governance board of people expert in a 
wide range of sport disciplines. The extent of that independence however, 
was open to question as the sport sector itself played no part in the 
appointment process. Sport on the Move had recommended a different 
process for appointment to the board which differed from the usual closed 
process, where ministers decide for themselves on committee memberships. 
Sport on the Move’s recommendation comprised a mix of direct sector 
representation and those with sector expertise. The recommendation also 
included an exhaustive list of qualities to characterise the board “with the 
unifying factor [of] a feeling for and knowledge of sport” (p. 35). 
In the late 1980s, definitions for these government-owned but non-
departmental organisations remained vague. For instance, while the purpose 
of state owned enterprises was clearly commercial in nature and described in 
the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986, other government agencies were 
created for a range of purposes but without the benefit of a classification 
system to guide their boards on their role as state agencies. There were 
regulatory services provided by agencies such as the commerce commission, 
advocacy services from the race relations conciliator and unique 
arrangements as specified under establishment legislation such as the 
accident compensation commission. 
The Hillary Commission, however, fell into the category of a government 
agency established by legislation and initially escaped the net of a 
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classification framework applicable only to crown entities set up by ministerial 
direction rather than by legislation. This situation changed when provisions of 
the new Public Finance Act in 1989 made a first attempt to classify crown 
entities (Scott, 2001, 269-274). Although many organisations are set up under 
legislation, the overall constraints on their behaviour such as financial 
management or reporting and accountability to parliament, are set by 
legislation which applies to the wider state sector. By 1989, reform of the rules 
on financial management via the Public Finance Act was well advanced and 
intended to assist government agencies meet their accountability 
requirements. Unfortunately, accountability tools for the wide range of crown 
entities were inadequate. Not until publication of the OAG‟s report on crown 
entity governance in 1996, was this matter satisfactorily addressed (Office of 
the Auditor General, 1996). 
The issue of funding for sport topped the new commission‟s agenda. 
Certainly, knowledge of the imminent launch of a new state-run lottery, Lotto, 
influenced the inquiry committee‟s recommendations. From the early 1980s, 
existing state-run lottery games, such as the Golden Kiwi, generated 
insufficient profits to respond adequately to a growing demand for community 
purposes funding generally and sport in particular. As early as 1975, Allan 
Highet, the then minister for recreation and sport began advocating for the 
introduction of Lotto (Grant, 1994, 248). 
 Many MPs, including prime minister, Rob Muldoon, opposed the 
introduction of Lotto which they believed added another and unnecessary 
form of gambling to the choices already on offer (Grant, 1994, 248). The 
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horse racing industry dominated the gambling industry and had done so for 
many years. By the mid-1980s, the racing industry board reported declining 
attendance at race meetings accompanied by a fall in off-course betting. The 
racing industry saw Lotto as a threat to its revenue base already controlled 
heavily through legislation. The industry had strong historical support in 
parliament. As far back as the 1880s government appointed a minister for 
racing providing the racing industry lobby direct access to ministers. In the 
1980s, the political right expressed concerns about the moral aspects of 
gambling and the further potential for Lotto to feed political slush funds (Grant, 
1994).  
By the mid 1980s, however, strong support for Lotto emanated from 
influential figures including Ron Scott, Mike Moore and Keith Hancox. Scott, in 
particular, considered that the profits from Lotto would be sufficient to fund 
recreation, sport, the arts and community initiatives (Ibid. 249). 
By early 1985, the introduction of Lotto appeared certain and after a 
tempestuous political decision-making process, the first Lotto sales 
commenced in mid 1987. The LGB now had large amounts of funds to 
distribute and in mid 1991, cabinet agreed that 20% of lotteries commission 
profits be paid directly to the Hillary Commission via the LGB (Cabinet Office, 
1991). The National government‟s 1991 manifesto committed to 21% of lottery 
profits going to sport. The 20% level of funding resulted from negotiation 
within cabinet rather than from a formal departmental policy proposal and 
represented a significant call on LGB funds. Despite this policy shortcoming, 
the 20% commitment remains unchanged. Public expectations for what might 
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be funded from Lotto profits ranged from welfare causes, to sport and the arts. 
When governments create new funding pools generally, new demands 
emerge in response to the pool‟s availability. This does not represent any 
form of suppressed demand but the sudden availability of new and significant 
funds from a government agency created new expectations for the sector of 
what might now be possible for sport NGOs to achieve. 
The National party‟s manifesto promise to fund sport from 21% in 1991 
was a significant level of commitment and which the sport sector expected, a 
point made to the minister for sport by the secretary for the department of 
internal affairs, Perry Cameron. Departmental chief executives rarely advise 
ministers on their election manifesto commitments. However, pressure on 
Cameron from Treasury to reduce tax-payer funding to sport motivated him to 
defend existing level of parliamentary allocations to recreation and sport. The 
commission‟s administration costs as well as Cameron‟s own departmental 
sport policy capacity came from taxpayer funds for which he was accountable. 
Any cuts to these public funds could potentially see lottery funds covering the 
commission‟s administration costs rather than being distributed to the sport 
sector as intended by the LGB. Long term, the commission‟s administration 
costs ballooned to $2.7 million by 1997/1998, which far exceeded the $1.3 
million sourced from DIA‟s annual budget allocation. 
Importantly, no discussion took place about the use of substantial 
amounts of Lotto funds between the department, the minister or the 
commission. Sport NGOs were not consulted on how funds might be allocated 
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despite having long sought access to a substantial funding pool. Instead, the 
commission took a „command and control approach‟ to distribution. 
Now able to fund more organisations and to a greater level, the 
commission designed new and ambitious funding programmes and, in 1988, 
launched a national sport funding programme to improve the management 
capacity of sport NGOs. The commission concluded that through this 
mechanism sport, would be able to leverage greater private sector funding 
whilst, at the same time, increasing levels of public funding (Shuttleworth, 
1989, G2). This conclusion assumed continued significant growth for Lotto in 
the foreseeable future and, that the Hillary Commission would continue to 
receive 20% of the profits. However, the latter was a political decision taken 
by cabinet and not enshrined in legislation. Moreover, by definition, funds from 
Lotto were not sourced from taxation and therefore not „public‟ within the strict 
definition of the Public Finance Act. Over time, this may have freed the 
commission from potentially much sterner scrutiny of its use of funds by select 
committees or through ministerial accountability mechanisms. In any case, 
cabinet did not revisit the 20% figure and this resulted in a funding windfall to 
the commission as Lotto enjoyed unprecedented growth through the 1980s 
and early 1990s. By 1997/1998, the LGB-allocated funding pool to the 
commission grew from $2.284 million a decade earlier to $30.6 million as a 
proportion of its total revenues of $35.056 million. No other government 
agency experienced this level of revenue growth. The commission in 1987 
was at the beginning of an unanticipated and extraordinary growth in power 
and influence over the sport sector, driven entirely by its control of the purse-
strings and a burgeoning revenue stream. 
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An opportunity emerged in the late 1980s to establish sport (in a 
recreation and leisure context) within the broad ambit of social policy. In their 
comprehensive submission to the 1988 Royal Commission on Social Policy, 
Cushman and Laidler placed recreation and leisure firmly on the social policy 
agenda and within that, the domain of sport. They noted “there is institutional 
evidence that recreation has an established place in the network of social 
services in New Zealand.” (p. 509). They also emphasised the importance of 
supporting the NGO component of the recreation and leisure sector, noting 
that many “could not survive without access to public resources and the 
„voluntary‟ sector represents too rich a component of New Zealand‟s cultural 
life to neglect.” (p. 512). Despite the positive impact of Royal Commission‟s 
report and frequent reference to its wider recommendations in contemporary 
discourse on social policy and social services NGOs, this section of the 
commission‟s report rarely emerges in that same discourse (Ministry of Social 
Policy, 2001, 61).  
 Establishment of the Hillary Commission also coincided with the early 
stages of public sector reforms under the Labour government. At that time, 
state agencies moved from funding and delivering everything ministers 
wanted to a separation of funding, purchasing and provision of services. Inter 
alia these and other reforms aimed to reduce government expenditure and the 
size of the public sector. Initially, when government decided that a „third party‟ 
undertake work rather than government itself, government funding practice 
presumed the third party was being to provide the services on its behalf 
irrespective of its for-profit or non-profit status. With ministerial 
encouragement, departmental managers acted quickly to implement this 
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approach. For instance, the ministry of health applied what appeared as a 
simple „funder-provider‟ split robustly to the delivery of health services. The 
commission applied a similar model equating sport NGOs to providers of sport 
services for the commission and therefore to government. (Dalziel & St John, 
1999). But sport NGOs were not providers in the same sense as service 
delivery organisations in the health or social services sector. Yet the 
„purchaser-provider‟ language featured in new commission funding 
agreements. The commission offered the structure and terms and conditions 
contained in these agreements with sport NGOS; in effect, on a „take it or 
leave it‟ basis. 
 As in other countries where similar public management reform was 
taking place, no public discourse took place on the implementation of such 
changes. Rather than drawing affected NGOs into the change process as 
contributors to change, instead, the debate was seen as primarily ideological 
and took place within the public management system. (Dixon & Kouzmin, 
1994, 52). With the benefit of hindsight, many who were part of the changes 
either as public officials or NGO providers, now conclude that the purchaser-
provider split failed. Former secretary of the Treasury, Graeme Scott identifies 
four particular reasons for the failure. First, significant and repeated 
mismatches existed between revenues to NGO providers and the costing 
models used by government and the providers. Second, the appearance of 
competitive pressures for efficiency and service quality and imposed by 
government tendering processes quickly became a problem for providers. 
Many were poorly set up for a commercial business model and had difficulty 
comprehending the shift in organisational thinking which accompanied ideas 
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of contracting. Third, the reality of political relationship management as it 
impacted on funding prioritisation was unhelpful (Scott, 2001, 283). In other 
words, departments were competing harder than ever for limited funds in the 
annual budget round. In turn, they needed to drive down prices with providers 
who were already under-resourced. We will come back to this issue in the 
next chapter. 
 In one respect, the move to introduce a more competitive funding 
model in the sport sector was hardly surprising given that at the most simple 
level, demand for funds already outstripped supply as sport NGOs started to 
plan more ambitious goals. It was a significant step, however, from the era of 
grant funding which characterised funding policies of the previous council for 
recreation and sport. Broadly defined expectations of performance akin to 
development funding accompanied the council‟s grant-aid funding. By 
contrast, the commission‟s new approach attempted to specify „outputs‟ which 
sport had to deliver in return for funding. Sport NGOs were unclear about the 
„purchasing‟ culture and about the language of outputs that accompanied 
these first steps towards the more demanding environment of contracting. 
 The commission‟s general manager, John Shuttleworth neatly 
summarised the service delivery paradigm goals for sport at a 1989 sport 
administrators‟ seminar: 
The Hillary Commission is attempting to increase the efficiency, 
economy, effectiveness and accountability of national sport 
organisations by upgrading their service delivery systems, whilst 
simultaneously addressing issues in New Zealand society (such as 
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equity, access, violence, doping and specific disadvantaged sport 
sectors) which affect the quantity and quality of mass participation. 
(New Zealand Assembly for Sport, 1989, G2) 
The Recreation and Sport Act required the commission to reflect government 
policy. This led the commission to address social policy issues. However, 
sport NGOs perceived the commission‟s turn to social policy as contrary to 
their vested interests. In other words, the commission‟s priorities were not 
NGO priorities (Ibid.). 
 The commission also identified a shortfall in NGO management, 
coaching effectiveness and planning. In part, the commission concluded that 
the shortfall was of sport‟s own making: 
There prevails, amongst many of these organisations, a welfare 
„hands-out‟ attitude whereby they expect as of right, the government to 
so support without strings or accountability their essential private 
activities. (Ibid.) 
During the next three years, pressure on the commission‟s funds rapidly 
increased with a wide range of recreation and sport organisations seeking 
support from the national sport funding programme. These organisations 
included many recreation and hobby organisations such as flower arranging 
and bird-watching. The commission was concerned that the sport dollar was 
now being stretched further than ministers had ever anticipated: beyond sport 
and beyond quite a narrow definition of recreation. As a first step and without 
consultation, the commission narrowed its list of organisations eligible for 
funding to predominantly national sport bodies and a few select recreation 
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organisations (OCHR, 1991, Vol. 519, 4850). At the same time, the 
commission also lobbied its minister to amend the Recreation and Sport Act 
to better match the new funding criteria. The commission was now coming 
under fire from those organisations which had lost their funding. Only a 
legislative mandate would provide the necessary justification form the 
commission to use in answering those critics. 
In 1991, the minister for recreation and sport, John Banks, introduced a 
bill to parliament with four main objectives. First, to make the concept of 
fitness and leisure activity a formal policy area within which sport now fell. 
Secondly, Banks sought to rename the Recreation and Sport Act 1987 as the 
Sport, Fitness and Leisure Act and to rename the government recreation and 
sport agency (the Hillary Commission) as „the Hillary Commission for Sport, 
Fitness and Leisure. Thirdly, he wished to reduce the commission‟s 
membership from eleven to nine members (eight of which would be appointed 
by the minister for sport, fitness and leisure upon the nomination of the 
minister for internal affairs). Finally, as part of a government-wide move to 
bring all quangos into line, he wished to classify the commission as a crown 
agency.8 
During his 1991 speech to the parliament introducing the bill, minister 
Banks (OCHR, 1991) outlined what he saw as the purpose of a sport, fitness 
and leisure policy: 
 
8
 Government classifies crown entities in three distinct ways. Crown agents which give effect 
to government policy within the law such as the Accident Compensation Corporation; 
autonomous crown entities which must have regard for the policies of the Government of the 
day e.g., the Hillary Commission; independent crown entities which are quasi-judicial or 
investigative (Scott, 2001). Government also establishes crown companies to carry out 
specific commercial activities. 
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This Bill is a milestone for New Zealand sport and leisure. It heralds the 
start of a new era in which the Hillary Commission will help New 
Zealanders of all ages and abilities to participate and achieve in physical 
activities. We pride ourselves on being a sporting nation, and have 
deserved a worldwide reputation for excellence in both team and individual 
pursuits. We must not take this position for granted. The challenge for New 
Zealand is to capitalise on the social benefits and publicity that can accrue 
from such success in the international sporting arena. We will soon see on 
the other side of the world the epitome of New Zealand sport - our national 
game of rugby football - demonstrating that to the rest of the world in no 
uncertain terms. (p. 4851) 
 In his speech, Banks (Ibid.) narrowed that purpose down to 
objectives relating to sport, fitness and leisure as the three core purpose 
areas 
The Government will promote sport, fitness, and leisure in the most 
constructive way possible to enhance the lives of all New Zealanders and 
to enhance our identity overseas. This is the most dynamic policy ever 
formulated by a party in government in the history of this Parliament. The 
Bill demonstrates the Government‟s absolute commitment to those three 
objectives. It also reinforces the role of the Hillary Commission in 
managing and creating the opportunities for participation in them. (p. 4851) 
The minister described the purpose of the policy as being “to equip all New 
Zealanders with a range of lifelong skills, interests, and positive attitudes to 
physical leisure” (p. 4851). Banks proposed that by supporting  activities for 
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different population groups such as young people, the elderly, people with 
disabilities and elite athletes, government achieved that purpose. 
 While very high level and broad in scope, the minister‟s policy 
objectives lacked detail. The records show that very little policy work lay 
behind this legislative change, thus leaving Banks without a clear policy 
rationale for his legislative change. Public policy generally aims to resolve a 
particular problem by changing behaviour and in this case, the only problem 
Banks and the commission faced was one of a funding pool stretched across 
too great a range of activities. Politicians receive a constant stream of advice 
from the public on what policy or service requires urgent attention. As Althaus, 
Bridgman and Davis (2007) put it, “there is never a shortage of people telling 
government what it should be doing” (p. 38). The public policy process links a 
number of government decisions towards a specific goal. Banks‟ express goal 
was one of enhancing people‟s lives through improving participation in 
physical leisure. No records exist of government documents outlining how to 
improve participation through sporting excellence. Nor did the minister 
(OCHR, 1991) explain how the legislative change better promoted sport and 
physical activity to achieve “lifelong skills, interests and attitudes to physical 
leisure.” (p. 4851). Peter Tapsell (Ibid.), the Labour opposition member for 
Eastern Māori spoke bluntly on this point: 
None of the great words and tremendous bombast that we listened to – 
which was typical of the Minister, I regret to say – had any substantial 
backing. (p. 4855) 
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In the end, „sport‟ featured prominently in the amended legislation. As Laidler 
and Cushman succinctly comment, “The Act proclaims that „sport means 
sport‟” (p. 176). They also observe that non-sport recreation, now excluded 
from the Act and therefore the commission‟s funding criteria, “was disowned 
and left to find a home where it could amid the turmoil of changes in local 
government, in professional alignments and in the user pays market place” (p. 
176). 
 While the issues of purpose and how to deliver the policy were 
unclear, the public policy environment strongly affected the commission‟s 
approach to funding the sport sector. As public sector agency, the 
commission was increasingly subject to the public sector management trends 
of the day. This included the use of contracting out as a means of achieving 
service delivery targets for government agencies.  
 Funders normally construct contracts to ensure that contractors 
undertake work in a way acceptable to the funders (Scott, 2001 and Dalziel & 
St John, 1999, 88). In the 1990s, government agencies followed two 
assumptions when contracting to achieve social objectives. First, public funds 
would be used more effectively, that is, competition for work tends to drive 
down costs (Scott, 2001). Second, by setting very clear goals and defining the 
performance indicators, the funder ensures enhanced accountability for what 
is wanted in exchange for the funds (Dalziel & St John, 1999, 87). 
 However, contracting according to these assumptions proved 
particularly onerous for sport NGOs as they did for NGOs in other sectors. 
Neither their structures nor cultures were suited to commercial thinking and 
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the language of government contracts (Easton, 1997). Contracting 
arrangements generated tension between the commission and some sport 
NGOs which perceived that contract reporting requirements were onerous 
and were more about what the commission wanted than what was good for 
sport (personal communication, meeting with a group of sport chief 
executives, February 13, 1998). Three year later, the 2001 ministerial 
taskforce to review New Zealand sport commented on the persistent nature of 
these tensions. (Minister for Sport Fitness and Leisure, 2001, 65) a 
phenomenon well known in other parts of the community sector such as 
health and social services. 
 The language and culture of „business models‟, commercialism and 
accountability now prevailed across the sport sector. The sector did not adapt 
quickly or easily to this new way of thinking about their „business‟. In part this 
was because sport NGOs inevitably focused their organisations‟ attention on 
sport specific goals. Not all boards and managers were ready to 
accommodate the new language of business and a changed economy. This is 
unsurprising. Then as now, volunteers ran the majority of the sport sector, 
committed not „business‟ models but to the sport itself. The 2001 taskforce 
(Ibid.) came to this conclusion rather late when it observed that “…the tension 
between traditional sporting bodies and new entrepreneurial sports agents is 
also forcing a process of adaptation to new social and economic 
circumstances” (p. 23). In making such a comment in 2001, some 17 years 
after Sport on the Move, the taskforce reinforced a perception that many parts 
of the sport sector found adaptation difficult and the business model a „poor fit‟ 
with their reason for being. Analysis of the business model „fit‟ with the 
 92 
voluntary sector has been addressed in social services research (Boston & St 
John, 1999, 104). While, there no research exists comparing the experiences 
of sport and social service volunteers, the underpinning of the non-profit 
sector by citizens‟ voluntary action suggests that the sport sector experience 
would be similar. 
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Chapter Five – 1995: The Hillary Commission and the 
Prime Minister’s Committee Review of High 
Performance Sport, ‘The Winning Way’ 
This chapter focuses on a six month and seminal period of time in 
1995, when government and private sector funding of elite sport took centre 
stage. The implementation of public sector reforms, sometimes referred to as 
„new public management‟ (Boston et al, 1996, 26) underpinned changes in the 
way government managed public funds. The Hillary Commission‟s 
implementation of contracting for all of its funding arrangements with sport 
NGOs forms part of the backdrop to this chapter. The sport sector became 
embroiled in these changes through its exposure to concepts of 
managerialism, government funding accountability and business models of 
administration promoted by the commission. The prime minister‟s review of 
elite sport funding came at a time when government‟s attention became 
focused on events and perceived opportunities in the year 2000. A tense 
relationship existed between the corporate-funded NZSF, the Hillary 
Commission and the NZOCGA. Officials persuaded the National government 
prime minister, Jim Bolger that by finding a resolution to this tension was a 
precondition to taking advantage of opportunities for New Zealand in the year 
2000 and specifically, at the 2000 Olympiad in Sydney. The chapter ends with 
a description of the transition to new funding arrangements for elite sport and 
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how influential individuals and organisations retained their positions of 
influence over the system that the review intended to change. 
In 1993, prime minister Bolger appointed the New Zealand 2000 
Taskforce to investigate the ways that New Zealand might benefit from the 
Sydney Olympic Games in 2000. Among the taskforce‟s recommendations 
was a review of funding for elite sport in New Zealand (New Zealand 2000 
Taskforce, 2000a, 22).9 
The 2000 taskforce members (Appendix C) argued that public 
expectations for a competitive New Zealand team at Sydney would be high. It 
also argued the need for an emphasis on New Zealand delivering and winning 
medals at Sydney as “there will be a significant long-term payback to the 
nation in terms of social and economic benefits covering tourism, trade, 
health, community and national development and pride” (New Zealand 2000 
Taskforce, 2000b, 3) 
The taskforce‟s recommendation did not derive from an entirely 
objective and neutral analysis of the elite sport funding environment. Since 
Sport on the Move in 1984, only the Hillary Commission‟s annual reports 
commented regularly on the country‟s sport delivery system and then, only in 
the context of the commission‟s own performance. Central government had 
very limited capacity to provide any independent commentary on the sport 
sector‟s status or on the commission‟s performance. Indeed, from 1987 to 
1994, DIA as the department overseeing the sport portfolio, provided no policy 
advice to the minister for sport on the goals and direction of the commission. 
 
9
 The brief of the New Zealand 2000 Taskforce was to advise the Bolger government on risks 
and opportunities emerging from the Sydney Olympic Games in 2000. 
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This was unusual as departments responsible for legal oversight of crown 
entities such as the commission, generally provided contestable policy advice 
to ministers on crown entity activity and performance. Contestable advice 
enables ministers to make judgements on crown entity performance based on 
politically neutral policy advice from departments.10 By 1994, DIA oversaw a 
sport, fitness and leisure portfolio reduced to a single official with no specialist 
expertise in sport, fitness or leisure. That official‟s role comprised studying the 
commission‟s board papers and briefing the secretary for internal affairs prior 
to the commission‟s monthly board meetings.11  
This shortfall in specialised independent portfolio advice meant that the 
minister received advice from the commission which tended to reflect 
positively on its own work. The sport sector itself continued to lobby the 
minister especially on the sector‟s view that government should make the 
most of the Olympic Games being in Sydney and in a New Zealand summer. 
The NZOCGA lobbied strongly for greater funding support in its 1994 report 
Pathway to Gold: 
The information provided to the Secretary General by various NOCs 
[National Olympic Committees] and interviews with 12 federations 
clearly points to the need for more funding to support elite athletes‟ 
preparation if New Zealand aims to win gold medals at Olympic and 
Commonwealth Games. (p. 4) 
 
10
 The principle of political neutrality of the public service has its origins in the Public Service 
Act 1912. In sum, public servants must provide full, free and frank advice to ministers without 
bias towards any particular political party. This provides the basis for maintaining the 
confidence of current and future ministers in the public service. 
11
 From 1987 to 2002, the Sport, Fitness and Leisure Act provided that the secretary for 
internal affairs have a place on the Hillary Commission board as of right. This aimed to ensure 
protection of the government‟s „ownership‟ interests in the commission. 
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Two particular political pressures bore down on the review process. 
First, an NZOCGA-sponsored debrief of sport administrators and coaches 
after the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games signalled the inevitable demand for 
greater public funding of high performance sport (personal files, Coaching 
New Zealand, New Zealand Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association 
debrief memorandum, August 21 and 22, 1992). Naturally, the NZOCGA 
expressed concerns that New Zealand athletes might not be well-enough 
prepared for what was, to all intents and purposes, an Olympiad on „home 
ground‟. 
Secondly, disagreement on the best way to fund elite sport fuelled 
rising tensions between the Hillary Commission and NZSF. The commission 
saw itself as the agency with a mandate to oversee all of the sport system in 
New Zealand, including elite sport. To some extent, it made itself accountable 
for that oversight by signalling international sport success in annual plans. 
The NZSF, however, originally established to focus on elite sport; claimed 
influence over $3 million worth of private sector funding not subject to the 
same accountabilities that applied to the commission. Furthermore, the NZSF 
disagreed with the commission‟s approach to elite sport funding and often 
said so publicly. Inevitably, the issue of leadership emerged and tensions 
between the parties at board and management levels made the process of 
accessing funding for elite sport a major challenge for sport NGO managers. 
These managers founded themselves caught having to navigate their way 
through the requirements of two dominant funding organisations as well as to 
manage relationships through the NZSF‟s private sector perspective and the 
public sector view of the commission.  
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In order to manage the distribution of two pools of money to sport 
NGOs and elite athletes, the Hillary Commission contracted the NZSF to carry 
out one of those tasks. One funding pool comprised funds made available by 
the commission to fund elite sport as it saw fit ($2.85 million in fiscal 
1994/1995). The NZSF sourced and administered a second pool of funds for 
elite sport from the private sector ($3.07 million in 1994/1995). 
The review committee‟s brief only focused on addressing the needs of 
elite sport. The three organisations represented on the review committee, 
however, derived their individual mandates from very different sources. All 
three perceived their individual right to lead the process of planning for a 
national sport delivery system. The government mandated the commission to 
act on its behalf; the NZSF as an independent NGO, drew its authority from its 
governors and over 50 member sport; NGOs authorised the NZOCGA to act 
in their interests on matters pertaining to Olympic and Commonwealth 
Games. Although clearly mandated to speak on behalf of the sector, the prime 
minister did not invite the 84 member New Zealand Assembly for Sport to join 
the review committee and ensure that sport NGOs had a voice at the review 
table. 
For the first time, government singled out elite sport and asked three 
influential and powerful bodies to think about this one issue. Previous reviews 
(such as Sport on the Move) only considered high performance sport in the 
context of the overall sport environment. Historically, the role and involvement 
of the private sector had not been addressed except in abstract ways. As far 
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back as 1984, the ministerial inquiry committee (Ministry of Recreation and 
Sport) observed: 
We are of the opinion that this whole topic [elite sport sponsorship] has 
not been closely examined either by industry or sport. Industry 
respondents indicated they would look favourable on promotional 
exercises with sport if the benefits could be demonstrated. However, 
this area is likely to remain undeveloped unless the initiative is taken 
either by sport or more appropriately by government. (p. 101) 
The review committee thus identified a number of benefits deriving 
from public and private investments in elite sport. In appointing prominent 
individuals from the private sector, the prime minister had forced those 
individuals to think about and then commit the sector to work alongside 
government and support a systematic approach to elite sport funding. Thus 
far, the private sector supported sports on an individual sport-to-sponsor 
relationship. The prime minister sought a centralised support system for elite 
sport in the wider national interest. 
The Hillary Commission directly controlled a third funding pool (the 
„Sport 2000‟ and „New Zealand Sports Academy‟ funds - $4.75 million in 
1995/1996).12  The LGB made these funds available to the commission by as 
an annual grant to support the build-up to the Sydney Olympics.13  
 
12
 The Sport 2000 and Academy funding pools were allocate by the LGB on instruction from 
the Minister of Sport. 
13
 Cabinet was able to instruct the LGB to make funds available as the LGB was a 
government-owned organisation (a Crown entity) under provisions of the Gaming and 
Lotteries Act 1977. 
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As well as the Hillary Commission and to build the review‟s credibility 
with the public, prime minister Bolger also consulted two important non-
government bodies, the NZOCGA, and the NZSF. In order to gain buy-in to a 
review from these actors, the minister of sport, fitness and leisure, John 
Banks, met with the chairs of all three organisations. Banks‟ primary goal was 
to gain their agreement for their organisations to participate in the review 
(Department of Internal Affairs, 1995a). 
Both the commission and NZSF, found a review of elite sport funding 
challenging. Both organisations saw themselves as central to any future 
process and perceived the newly appointed review committee as a process 
where only one organisation would „survive‟ as the „manager‟ or controller of 
high performance sport funding. The NZOCGA supported a process that 
addressed its members‟ funding priorities and ensured support for 
programmes which improved performances at Olympic and Commonwealth 
Games.  
Shortly after announcing the review, Bolger appointed New Zealand 
rugby icon and corporate leader, Wilson Whineray, as the review committee 
chair. The committee‟s brief was to review the organisation and funding of 
high performance sport in New Zealand. The committee comprised 10 
members (Appendix D). Far from representing the direct interests of high 
performance sport in New Zealand, the membership explicitly represented the 
four key players: the commission, the NZSF, the NZOCGA and government. 
The DIA local government and community policy unit with responsibility 
for the government‟s sport, fitness and leisure portfolio serviced the review 
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committee. Unlike the 1984 ministerial inquiry, representatives from the 
government and the private sector undertook this review. Hart, Beattie, 
Whineray and Collins had distinguished corporate backgrounds. Whineray 
chaired the board of Carter, Holt Harvey one of New Zealand‟s biggest 
corporates, Collins was chief executive of Brierley Investments, Hart worked 
for the corporate division of Fletcher Challenge and Beattie held directorships 
on many leading New Zealand companies. 
Both Whineray and Beattie also had strong links to government; 
Beattie as a former governor-general and Whineray as Hillary Commission 
board chair. As NZOCGA president, Beattie represented the only „voice‟ for 
the sport sector at the review committee table. The committee‟s government 
members represented distinct government interests: the prime minister‟s 
department through Somerville (and through her, Taskforce 2000), Banks as 
the sport minister through Van Gulik, and DIA through Blakeley and 
Lawrence. DIA brought significant experience from its policy advice role and 
its long history of administering government funding to sport. 
Although Bolger concerns focused on resolving elite sport funding 
issues and, in particular, a means of resolving the different approaches of the 
two funders, he failed to entertain the need for a mandated voice for the sport 
NGOs the review sought to assist. The New Zealand Assembly for Sport‟s 
absence from the review committee illustrates a further example of the roles 
taken by politically powerful individuals in government reviews of New 
Zealand sport. The mandate and representiveness of such individuals were 
often unclear. The assembly lacked strong political influence and, 
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underfunded, found itself restricted to mostly contract work for the Hillary 
Commission and making submissions on changes to government policy or 
legislation which affected the sport sector. 
The review committee convened in early April 1995 and, in order to 
assist the review process, immediately agreed to appoint an independent 
consultant. Keen to decide on its own processes, the committee agreed on 
the need for advice completely independent of government and the New 
Zealand sport sector. Perceived independence was important to the 
committee especially given the clear influence of ministers over the 
appointment of members, the committee‟s government-drafted terms of 
reference, public funding and servicing by DIA. Keenly aware of the vested 
interests around the table, Whineray wanted to ensure that the committee was 
seen to be acting fairly (Department of Internal Affairs, 1995c, 10) 14 
The question of how much public money the Committee would request 
sat at the heart of the review along with who would be responsible for its 
administration. As for the previous 50 plus years, government had no explicit 
policy on funding elite sport. Indeed, in advice to minister Banks in June 1995, 
DIA signalled the lack of an overarching sport, fitness and leisure policy. DIA 
further advised that if Banks agreed to the development of a policy, DIA 
officials would draft the outline of such a policy after the completion of the elite 
sport review (Department of Internal Affairs, 1995). 
From the beginning, questions over the extent of a public benefit from 
increased government‟s investment in elite sport split the committee. The 
 
14
 The review committee appointed Coopers and Lybrand (Canberra) as consultants to the 
review under the leadership of Hugh Watson. 
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public sector committee members insisted on a clear evidence of such 
benefits to guide further funding recommendations and, indeed any 
consequent policy work. Cognisant of the government budget processes, they 
pointed out that the committee needed to demonstrate that justifying tax-payer 
investment in elite sport required evidence of sufficient public benefits relative 
to the quantum of funding sought. 15 
For an analysis of the public benefits from government funding of elite 
sport, the committee drew heavily on the only available New Zealand 
research; undertaken by the Hillary Commission in 1993. This research 
focused mostly on the wider economic impacts of sport on the economy such 
as overall expenditure by the sport sector and tax revenue. It did not examine 
the case for or against the public funding of sport. The committee sought no 
other data on this subject. 
By contrast to the public officials on the committee, remaining 
members focussed on less easily measured benefits to New Zealand such as 
national identity and social cohesion. The committee‟s final report, The 
Winning Way, however, equivocated on the matter: 
The decision on whether or not to supply funding will depend a good 
deal on whether the Government perceives the public benefits from 
high performance sport success to be significantly greater than the 
costs (Department of Internal Affairs, 1995c, 25). 
and 
 
15
 The Review Committee agreed that government funding must have publicly beneficial 
character which could be classified as a „public good‟. 
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The benefit of enhancing the community‟s pride in being a New 
Zealander and the idea that the community will feel better about itself 
as an effect of reflected glory from high performance success is 
important, but difficult to value quantitatively (Ibid. 27). 
Despite equivocating on the issue of public benefit, the committee clearly 
identified the critical stakeholders in New Zealand high performance sport. The 
stakeholder list identified by the committee contained predominantly sport NGOs in 
five categories shown in Table 2 below (Ibid. 36): 
 
Table 2: New Zealand Elite Sport Stakeholders 
Category Organisations and individuals 
Funders government, corporate sponsors and club members 
Recipients of funds athletes and coaches 
Sport administrators national sport NGOs16  
Sport service 
individuals 
sport scientists and sports medicine practitioners 
Sport service 
organisations 
four NGOs: Coaching New Zealand, Sport Science New 
Zealand, Sports Medicine New Zealand and the New 
Zealand Assembly for Sport 
 
The list shows that the committee‟s cognisance of the array of 
volunteers and voluntary organisations involved in the sport sector and, 
indeed, vital to the sector‟s existence. In addition, the committee recognised 
the importance of a new and distinct category: paid professional groups of 
 
16
 In 1995, the Hillary Commission annually funded approximately 84 national sport bodies. 
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sport scientists, sports medicine specialists along with sport service 
organisations such as Coaching New Zealand and the New Zealand 
Assembly for Sport.  
Sam (2005, 83) suggests that the design and intention of taskforces 
and committees to review sport enable NGOs to join in the policy process. 
While Sam has a point (i.e., without such committees, NGOs have little 
access to the policy process) as a means to develop sound policy input from 
the any sector, taskforces and review committees alone remain unsatisfactory 
tools of engagement. Like most government reviews of this kind, the 
committee failed to institute feedback mechanisms for the sport NGOs to 
report back to the committee following a first round of consultation meetings. It 
is debatable, therefore, whether merely „joining‟ the process was sufficient for 
the sport NGOs. The literature on contemporary civil society-government 
relationships reveals long-standing concerns from NGOs that just engaging in 
the process is not enough (Ministry of Social Policy, 2001, 80). Increasingly, 
government agencies recognise that engaging with citizens can take many 
forms. Engagement ranges from simply providing community organisations 
and citizens with information to one-off consultation on specific issues to 
supporting community-based decision-making. ( 
Figure 1 below). Other approaches more likely to deeply engage 
communities of interest, include collaborative processes which demand co-
operation, shared goals and lead to joint decision-making. Community 
decision-making represents the most devolved end of the engagement 
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spectrum. Once the committee formed its conclusions, it simply informed the 
sector about the recommendations.  
 
Figure 1: Different forms of engagement with citizens 
17 
 
This review did not seriously engage with the sport sector. The 
committee held only two regional meetings with sport NGOs in Auckland and 
Wellington. Rather than soliciting requests for advice or seeking deeper 
engagement through these meetings, the committee merely provided 
progress reports on decisions already made. Committee members such as 
Beattie understood the sport sector‟s misgivings about working with NZSF 
and the commission. That they didn‟t urge a more robust feedback 
mechanism may appear surprising. While the prime minister‟s mandate 
focused on funding and the wider sport system, Bolger provided no clear 
direction around ensuring sector buy-in. 
 
17
 Office for the Community and Voluntary Sector, (2005). Retrieved on May 27, 2006 from 
http://www.goodpracticeparticipate.govt.nz/the-basics/index.html  
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The committee discussed at length the relationship between the private 
sector and government in funding elite sport. The wider government interests 
in funding high performance sport focused around the justification for public 
sector intervention where normal commercial principles do not apply 
(Department of Internal Affairs, 1995c, 21). The committee‟s private sector 
interests, conversely, centred on issues of national pride and highlighting the 
economic benefits of bringing major events to New Zealand. The committee 
also touched on regulatory matters of public interest in sport such as drugs in 
sport and gambling controls. This latter group of issues remained peripheral to 
the Winning Way’s main thrust, that of increased public funding for elite sport. 
The private sector interests were problematic. The NZSF‟s business 
interests at the table persuaded the committee to report the reluctance of 
potential and current private sector sponsors of sport to fund a public sector 
agency (Department of Internal Affairs, 1995c, 39). The committee received 
no hard evidence of this conclusion. Many major New Zealand corporates 
were missing from NZSF‟s list of corporate partner. The committee failure to 
test NZSF‟s conclusions on this matter possibly distracted the committee from 
deliberating on whether other mechanisms might attract private sector 
interest. 
In the end, the committee concluded (again without explicit evidence) 
that government agencies lacked the “distinctive skill set and culture” (Ibid. 
39) to service elite sport. The report did not seek to substantiate why that 
might be the case, but went into detail on a broad range of private sector‟s 
motivations to fund international sport. These interests included brand 
 107 
profiling in local or international markets, associating business with success 
as defined by winners in sport, and “returning a benefit to the community upon 
which [the] business depends” (Ibid. 21).  
The committee failed to resolve the issue of whether public funding of 
elite sport produced more public benefits than private benefits. The committee 
(Ibid.) summarised its arguments equivocally: 
…..public funding of high performance sport generates a mixture of 
public and private benefits and… the public benefits in relation to New 
Zealand society‟s view of itself as a nation has a high perceived value 
to the Government. (p. 23) 
The committee agreed, however, on the critical importance of a 
systematic approach to supporting elite sport. The committee conceived a 
vision of an elite sport system simply as a combination of sufficient funding 
and an organisation dedicated to meeting the needs of elite sport. IN the 
committee‟s view, such an organisation required “specific leadership, skills 
sets and the right organisational culture” (Ibid, 38). The report did not 
elaborate on the nature of these qualities and therefore the rationale for a 
separate elite sport organisation seemed more driven by the need to resolve 
political tensions between the government and private sector ie the 
commission and NZSF. 
The committee argued that, if government increased its investment, a 
greater private sector contribution would be forthcoming over time (Ibid. 
1995c, 35). Critically, however, the NZSF provided no clear evidence of an 
explicit commitment to more funds from any business group beyond 
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commitments to the NZSF from its existing funders. At best, Bolger had 
secured continued commitment of $3m and a request for $4.6 million from the 
tax-payer. 
The committee proposed a new organisation to plan for and fund New 
Zealand‟s elite sport system. It also recommended a contract between the 
Hillary Commission and this new organisation to manage accountability for 
the taxpayer component of the new funding. This approach assumed that 
government‟s contracting arrangements were a satisfactory means of 
accounting for the use of taxpayer funds. The Winning Way conceived a 
contract to “purchase” a “deliverable and measurable” (Ibid. 40) high 
performance sport strategy. The strong theme of contractualism which, by 
then pervaded the public sector, also found a foothold in the Winning Way. 
The committee underestimated the challenge of implementing these 
contract arrangements. Although the contract would be between the new 
organisation and the Hillary Commission, achieving elite sport results 
remained the responsibility of sport NGOs and more specifically the athletes. 
To confirm the link between public funding and the elite sport success, 
expectations of performance needed to accompany the transfer of elite sport 
funds from new organisation to the national sport organisations. The new 
organisation had the challenge of developing applying incentives to the NGOs 
in order to ensure the production of results in exchange for the funds. 
Government frequently contracts NGOs as third parties to deliver 
services on its behalf. For instance, on a nationwide scale Plunket New 
Zealand delivers health services and Barnardos New Zealand delivers social 
 109 
services. In this case, however, a contract with the commission implied elite 
sport results via a subcontracting arrangement between this new organisation 
and the Hillary Commission. No discussions took place with the sport sector 
on its satisfaction with this arrangement or earlier commission or NZSF 
contracting. Furthermore, this sort of contracting arrangement gave the new 
organisation considerable power over the sport NGOs. The very notion of 
contracting for elite sport success assumed that winners could indeed be 
„picked‟ ahead of time. Contracts are, by their very nature, designed to give 
the funder some certainty about the use of its money (Greve and Ejersbo, 
2005, 15). This contract delegated the new organisation powers over NGOs if 
they wanted access to the funds. The new regime would prove difficult to 
manage. 
Although there were clear public expectations of increased government 
funding of elite sport, the Whineray committee‟s recommendations needed to 
pass through a public sector filter before they got to ministers. The $4.6 
million sought represented a 400% increase in taxpayer funding of sport and 
the first allocation of public funds specifically to elite sport (Department of 
Internal Affairs, 1995a). DIA officials provided minister Banks with their 
assessment of the committee‟s broadly stated public benefits which justified 
new government funding. It remained for Banks to convince his cabinet 
colleagues to provide the funds. The new organisational arrangements 
provided Banks with a lever. The committee addressed and provided an 
answer to prime minister Bolger‟s request for coherence across and 
agreement between the commission, NZSF and NZOCGA. It gave Banks a 
new context for arguing his case for new funding with his cabinet colleagues. 
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Banks needed to argue his case in the public management system 
context of the times. Public sector reforms of the 1990s introduced the idea of 
„strategic result areas‟ (SRAs) for government agencies. These SRAs 
represented cabinet‟s medium-term high priorities. Each government agency 
adopted „key result areas‟ (KRAs) as its contribution to the government‟s 
SRAs. Ministers then formalised these KRAs in government agency chief 
executive performance agreements. 
The National government published The Path to 2010 containing the 
first group of SRAs covering the period 1994 to 1997.18 Banks‟ case to cabinet 
centred on the proposition that government funding support to elite sport 
directly supported three of the SRAs: maintaining and accelerating economic 
growth, community security, health and disability services and social cohesion 
(Department of Internal Affairs, 1995b). For the first time a minister linked 
funding for sport to a set of high level government goals. But little evidence 
supported these tenuous links. For example, Banks argued that elite sport 
contributed to the health and disability strategic area by promoting healthy 
lifestyles through elite athlete images. He also proposed that elite sport 
funding helped manufacturing and accelerate economic growth because 
personal productivity increased in a community “which has an enhanced 
sense of well-being and national identity” (Department of Internal Affairs, 
1995b). 
 
18
 The eight strategic result areas in Pathway to 2010 were: Maintaining and Accelerating 
Economic Growth, Enterprise and Innovation, External Linkages, Education and Training, 
Community Security, Social Assistance, Health and Disability Services, and Treaty Claims 
Settlement. 
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From the records it appears that neither the review committee nor 
government officials had any hard evidence upon which to base the 
arguments which Banks put to his colleagues. Politically, however, the 
arguments were sufficient allowing ministers to use the committee‟s 
arguments in an uncritical public arena to justify a decision to fund elite sport 
from public funds. Ministers therefore agreed to the committee‟s 
recommendations for an allocation of $4.6 million per annum to elite sport, 
and to the establishment of a new organisation to support the promotion and 
development of a national elite sport system. These funds augmented existing 
funds ($10.67 million) already allocated to the Hillary Commission from the 
LGB and the private sector‟s contribution ($3 million) via NZSF.19  
While Whineray‟s committee recommended „what‟ needed to be done, 
the process of „how‟ was daunting. The involvement of strong personalities 
such as the chief executives of the NZSF, Hillary Commission and NZOCGA 
concerned the prime minister who wanted to ensure a well-managed 
transition to the new arrangements. Throughout the process, sport NGOs 
looked on with little influence over the process but with a great deal of interest 
in the outcome. 
The transition process to merge the elite sport interests of NZSF and 
the Hillary Commission commenced immediately with the goal of forming a 
 
19
 The review committee failed to factor GST into its recommendations. The final budget 
decision to allocate $4.6 million included GST at 12.5% ($575,000), a surprise to most 
members of the committee. Treasury‟s advice to the committee failed to alert members to this 
issue.  
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new NGO to develop and implement a new elite sport strategy and distribute 
elite sport funding.20  
Although a small part of the chronology, the transition further illustrates 
the difficulty in unravelling the very tensions the original review sought to 
resolve. Again, powerful individuals played critical roles, all of whom closely 
connected to the organisations in the restructure. The transition process 
compromised the „independence‟ sought by Whinarey at the outset. The 
concept of a “non-Crown” organisation or NGO would be a complex idea for 
both the private sector and public sector stakeholders to manage. The 
process relied on the transition process producing a new organisation with 
three important characteristics. It needed to: 
 successfully attract private sector funds 
 meet the statutory requirements of the Public Finance Act 1989 
in managing tax payer funds 
 provide a new and improved set of funding arrangements for 
the sport sector. 
Prime minister Bolger appointed the transition committee including corporate 
figure, John Hood as chair.21  The remaining committee members comprised 
representatives of the affected organisations: Paul Collins (chair of NZSF), 
David Howman (a leading sports lawyer and a Hillary Commission board 
 
20
 The NZSF was constituted as an incorporated society. A new organisation was to be 
independent of government (“non-Crown”) in a form decided by negotiation between the 
NZSF and a transition committee. 
21
 As a senior figure at of New Zealand's largest companies, Fletcher Challenge Ltd. John 
Hood also chaired the America's Cup Task Force and acted as a governor and executive 
board member of NZSF. In 1995, New Zealand Cricket engaged Hood to chair its major 
operational, strategic and governance review of the sport. 
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member), Tim Castle (barrister and chair of NZOCGA), Bruce Cameron 
(athletes‟ representative) and Roger Blakeley (secretary for internal affairs for 
the government).22  
In May 1996, the transition committee reported agreement from all 
parties to disestablish NZSF and to replace it with a new organisation to 
develop and implement a national elite sport strategy. In its proposal for a new 
organisation the transition committee attempted to convey a solution in which 
neither the Hillary Commission nor NZSF were perceived to have „won‟ or 
„lost‟. In part, the organisation‟s novel governance arrangements appeared not 
greatly different from the status quo with members of the former NZSF board 
joined by representatives of the Hillary Commission and NZOCGA (Appendix 
E). In sum, however, the commission survived and NZSF faced 
disestablishment.  
The make up of the new organisation‟s board revealed how the 
transition committee attempted to meet the expectations of the three 
organisations involved in the original review and to protect government‟s 
interests. Privately, many sport administrators considered that despite the 
new look, little had changed especially given the predominance of NZSF 
interests. The new board comprised representation from all parties. The 
transition committee proposed six members from an electoral college of 30 
members nominated from the existing NZSF membership of predominantly 
business sector interests thereby preserving the essential elements of NZSF. 
The committee invited the Hillary Commission to appoint two further board 
 
22
 As DIA‟s chief executive Roger Blakeley had responsibility for the sport, fitness and leisure 
portfolio. 
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members include the secretary for internal affairs already on the commission 
board. NZOCGA appointed the final two members (Department of Internal 
Affairs, 1996). 
Again, a critical set of organisational arrangements with an impact on 
all sports NGOs high costs budgets (elite sport) lacked a formal voice for 
sport. The NZOCGA certainly represented a voice in matters concerning 
Olympic and Commonwealth Games. Beyond those matters, the NZOCGA 
lacked real authority to speak on behalf of the whole sport sector. Further, it 
lacked systems to canvas the wider issues of a national sport system with the 
NGOs running the different codes. 
In a decision which surprised the whole sector, the transition committee 
recommended retaining the name „New Zealand Sports Foundation‟. The 
committee argued that retaining the name saved rebranding costs and 
avoided a risk of “brand confusion” in the sponsorship market. Sport NGOs 
expected the review to resolve tensions between organisations and 
individuals. There was a wide perception within the sport community that the 
NZSF had somehow „rescued‟ itself. The new board then retained the former 
chief executive which reinforced that perception. 
Of particular interest in the new arrangements was the proposal to fund 
the new NZSF through a Hillary Commission contract. Not only would the 
commission now have considerable power over the NZSF, it would be 
represented at both ends of the contract, i.e., commission board members 
were also NZSF board members. DIA officials expressed concerns that this 
represented a conflict of interest. They considered that sufficient 
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accountability existed through the contract mechanism alone without the 
commission‟s further involvement at the delivery end of the contract 
(Department of Internal Affairs, 1996). 
The transition committee argued that there was a greater risk of 
compromising a co-ordinated approach to supporting elite sport unless all 
parties were at the table. The committee‟s concept of „all parties‟ excluded a 
voice for the sport NGOs. The Whineray committee recommendations 
seemed to respond to the original call from NGOs for a „one-stop shop‟ for 
funding and a “planned and integrated approach to effective delivery and 
servicing of high performance sport” (Department of Internal Affairs, 1995c, 
15). Proposals for a new and separate organisation, augmented by a single 
funding application process seemed to „tick all the boxes‟ for the sport sector. 
Many in the sector, however, perceived these new arrangements as more 
focused on managing a power balance between funders. The interests of 
sport NGOs were again pushed to into the background. In May 1996, Cabinet 
agreed to the new arrangements and the new NZSF began operation from 1 
July 1996 under contract to the Hillary Commission. 
In the context of government delegating responsibility to third parties 
and using crown entities to manage government involvement in sport, the lack 
of engagement of sport NGOs created new risks for government and for sport. 
In particular, NZSF funding of sport NGOs through contracts for elite sport 
results fell short of guaranteeing success. Unless individual sport NGOs, the 
commission and NZSF jointly agreed on the best way to achieve results 
specific to each sport, sport NGOs risked becoming involved in a „one size fits 
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all‟ approach. NZSF contracts focused on sport NGOs elite report results 
rather than a system. As noted earlier, the review did not meaningfully engage 
with the sport sector and many sports felt that the new arrangements were a 
fait accompli from an early stage in the review process. It seems likely that the 
National government had little sense of how the sector perceived the review‟s 
outcomes beyond the new money. The minister made no attempt to ensure a 
subsequent positive relationship between NZSF and the commission. Given 
the prime minister‟s concerns about the relationship forming the genesis of 
the review, Banks could have asked DIA to report on the relationship to give 
him and thus the prime minister comfort that the new arrangements had a 
strong chance of success. By not doing so, Banks lost any leverage with 
either the commission or NZSF to support the sport sector‟s need for co-
ordinated funding and strategy over the long-term. 
This era of government intervention in sport ended in 1997 when a new 
minister for sport, fitness and leisure, Murray McCully, established an office 
for tourism and sport (OTSP) located in the ministry of economic 
development. McCully already carried ministerial responsibilities as the 
associate minister for economic development. Rather than retaining DIA as 
the department overseeing the sport portfolio, he changed the portfolio‟s 
direction looking for synergies between sport, tourism and economic 
development. (Ministry of Economic Development, 1997). Considerable policy 
development work normally accompanies major policy shifts of this kind. 
Ministers require consultation with affected departments and other parties, in 
this case the sport sector. No such consultation took place despite the 
involvement of the ministry of economic development implying a new purpose 
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for government involvement in sport. Moreover, McCully paid no attention to 
ensuring the protection of the sport portfolio‟s institutional memory, held in 
DIA since 1937. In effect, the move to OTSP returned government-level 
intervention in sport to the fragmented environment of the past. McCully 
established the OTSP as a small office with only two policy staff providing him 
with policy advice on both the Hillary Commission and the New Zealand 
Sports Drug Agency. 
In the absence of DIA‟s expertise, minister McCully exposed to the 
sport portfolio to the risk of inadequate oversight of government expenditure. 
New tensions for the sport sector emerged as it grappled with an environment 
of increased monitoring and accountability for funds. Despite these difficult 
times for sport NGOs the Hillary Commission reassured McCully that sport 
NGOs would be: 
……kept well informed on progress towards the development and 
implementation of a high performance sport strategy….[and]….to 
enable [those NGOs] to have confidence in forward planning 
arrangements (Department of Internal Affairs, 1996). 
The review of elite sport resulted in more public funding for sport but 
distanced sport NGOs further from government processes to involve itself in 
the sport sector. The Hillary Commission became involved in a contractual 
arrangement which sought elite sport outcomes yet placed those responsible 
for creating the results a further step down the delegation chain. In the 
absence of a single advocacy organisation for the sport sector, sport 
administrators used the mass media to voice their continued dissatisfaction 
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with government funding as they struggled to meet the costs of running sport. 
Former Olympic athlete Roy Williams turned journalist wrote in 1997, “McCully 
should be warned there is growing anger in New Zealand that sport is not 
getting a fair deal from the Government……Many of New Zealand‟s sports 
clubs are finding it more and more difficult to survive financially” (p. B8). 
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Chapter Six – ‘Getting Set for an Active Nation’ 
This chapter examines the background to and impact of the 2001 
ministerial inquiry into sport fitness and leisure. Like the 1984 sport inquiry, 
the sport sector lobbying of the opposition party persuaded the opposition 
spokesman for sport that the sport system was under strain. The subsequent 
inquiry led to legislative change as a tool to solve problems in the sport 
funding system and the creation of the third iteration of a government sport 
funding agency. The inquiry, conducted by a taskforce appointed by the new 
Labour government and chaired by educationist John Graham, raised a wide 
range of public policy issues linked to sport including health, education and 
tourism. In attempting to establish a clear rationale for government to fund the 
sport sector, the taskforce drew strong connections between the benefits of 
sport participation and improved public health. The chapter examines those 
connections and the extent to which the taskforce engaged the sport sector in 
its review in coming to its conclusions. The final recommendation which this 
chapter examines is the need to establish new legislation in order to create a 
new crown entity for sport and whether this led to an improved environment 
for the sport sector. 
By 1999, the strained relationship between the Hillary Commission and 
the sport sector was public (Garlick, 1992, 39). Instead of a „one-stop-shop‟ 
for sport funding as envisioned by the 1995 Whineray committee reviewing 
elite sport, a two step process confronted sport NGOs. First, sport 
administrators completed a paper-based funding application process for their 
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sport development and elite performance programmes. Then, in order to 
negotiate their funding, sport NGOs needed to work with the Hillary 
Commission for development funds and with NZSF for high performance 
funds. This perpetuated the fragmentation of elite sport funding which the 
Whineray committee attempted to remedy. More troubling was the lack of 
national leadership. In 1999, Gilbertson et al surveyed 83 chief executives of 
national sport organisations who reported that the New Zealand sport 
environment lacked a shared national vision and shared national leadership 
(Gilbertson, D. Butler, G. & Davies, J. 1999). 
In absence of a voice for sport and with no prospect of national sport 
organisations addressing the issue at a board level, a group of sport chief 
executives formed an ad hoc collective, the Chief Executives of Sport Forum 
(the author‟s personal files, January 28, 1998). By arranging themselves as a 
collective, the forum avoided the problem of a legal structure and the need for 
funding. The chief executives aimed initially to express their concerns about 
the underfunding of sport and the channelling of resources to the Sydney 
Olympics (Sanders, 1999, B10). The collective maintained a low level of 
activity for the next eight years, but eventually it ceased to function due to a 
lack of administrative support and the work load falling on a few of the more 
influential administrators. 
At the end of 1999, the commission‟s chief executive, Peter Dale 
(personal communication, December 20, 1999) also expressed concerns 
about the funding of sport NGOs, perhaps picking up on the forum‟s concerns. 
In a letter to all sport chief executive‟s in December 1999, he wrote: 
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In short, our whole sport system is under stress. In the drive to cut 
costs, sport (at nearly all levels), has gone past lean. It is now time for 
us to re-state the case for sport. To paraphrase JFK – ask not what our 
country can do for sport but what sport can do for our country. (For 
those in the recreation field I use sport in its widest sense – as a 
marketing tool to generate more revenue for our sector). 
The change from a National government to a Labour-Progressive 
coalition administration in 1999 brought a new minister to the sport, fitness 
and leisure portfolio. Trevor Mallard had a long interest in the portfolio as the 
Labour opposition‟s spokesman for the sector. Prior to the 1999 election, 
sport sector interests lobbied Mallard to change the government „sport 
system‟, should Labour win the 1999 general election. Once the new Labour 
government was in place, Mallard (now the new minister for sport) quickly 
signalled his goal of a policy framework for government‟s involvement sport, 
fitness and leisure. 
I think it would be fair to say that Government is not perceived to have 
a clear and widely understood policy framework for the sport, fitness 
and leisure sector. (Mallard, 2000) 
Disquiet within the sector about the modus operandi of the Hillary 
Commission, prevailed and the new minister for sport, fitness and leisure had 
the commission firmly in his sights. 
While Government does not „own‟ sport in New Zealand, we do have a 
responsibility for encouraging vision and leadership – and that has 
been sadly lacking in recent years. (Ibid) 
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Minister Mallard followed up these concerns in 2000, by appointing a 
ministerial taskforce on sport, fitness and leisure, chaired by leading educator 
and former All Black, John Graham. Like the 1984 inquiry committee, Mallard 
appointed the taskforce membership to reflect diversity (Appendix F). Mallard 
also attempted to steered clear of appointing members who might be 
perceived by the sporting public as „captured‟ by any of the key sector 
players. The three factions who dominated the elite sport review in 1995 
remained; with the commission, NZSF and NZOCGA - now renamed the 
NZOC, still wary of each other (Office for Tourism and Sport, 2000a).  
The minister‟s brief charged the taskforce to “define the vision for sport, 
fitness and leisure for the next 25 years.” (Office for Tourism and Sport, 
2000b). The brief also sought the taskforce‟s views on a wide range of 
contemporary issues for recreation and sport and specifically on progress on 
recommendations contained in the previous reports: Sport on the Move, 
Recreation and Government in New Zealand and the Winning Way. The list of 
issues ranged from the role of informal activities in modern society to elite 
sport delivery to “issues surrounding the sovereignty of organised sport and 
recreation and sport organisations in New Zealand.” (Ibid). 
The taskforce‟s final report, Getting Set for an Active Nation made 
wide-ranging recommendations including prominent proposals to align 
government spending on sport with achievement of public health outcomes. In 
putting the case for increased government investment, the taskforce made 
connections between sport participation and health in very direct ways. 
Referring to Hillary Commission research in 1998, the taskforce asserted that: 
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……there is a well-established cause and effect linkage between 
positive, regular, physical activity and sport (Office for the Minister of 
Sport, Fitness and Leisure, 2000, 36). 
and 
given the proven value of physical activity the Taskforce states 
unequivocally that a country‟s leaders – with this knowledge – are 
derelict in their duties if they ignore the need to fully support a more 
physically active nation. (Ibid. 37). 
The taskforce made much of this connection, referring to a body of 
research that supports this positive view of physical activity. Research on the 
connections between the physical activity generally and public health is 
contested. The taskforce cited a body of evidence supporting propositions that 
“……a healthy society is the foremost benefit of physical activity” (p. 37). The 
taskforce report also remained silent on the quality and quantity of physical 
activity that might be ‟good for people‟. 
Consensus amongst researchers on the accuracy of such a statement 
remains elusive particularly as it pertains to sport participation. In a wide-
ranging literature review in 2004, Reid et al observed that the “mechanisms 
for explaining how physical activity contributes to general well-being and a 
positive quality of life have not been established” (p. 35). In relation to 
exercise and its role in preventing coronary heart disease, they also said: 
While physical activity appears to impart a degree of protection against 
the risk of CVD [cardio-vascular disease] mortality in women as a result 
of its direct effect on cardiovascular function and role in attenuating 
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other risk factors, the research in this area is somewhat inconclusive. 
(p. 120) 
A stronger body of evidence exists, however, associating poor health 
outcomes with social-economic status. Gauvin (2003) comments that public 
health policies which proscribe physical activity generally ignore the paucity of 
data on what interventions might effect whole population changes. The latter 
critique applies the Graham report which similarly fails to provide conclusive 
evidence of measurable public health benefits from sport participation. Gauvin 
also cites a wide range of research showing that “the prevalence of health 
damaging behaviours (e.g. smoking, delinquency) including physical activity is 
higher amongst populations that live in more deprived areas….even after 
controlling for individual difference variables” (p. 1). 
The weak link between physical activity and improved health outcomes 
for the whole population places at risk many of the benefits from sport 
participation claimed by the Graham taskforce‟s recommendations. 
Government interventions of the past focused on similar assumptions of 
health benefits from exercise. The report acknowledged the need for an „all of 
government‟ approach to increasing physical activity levels and adopted a 
clear focus on a funding strategy to meets the goals of government. The 
report was silent, however, on the goals and aspirations of sport NGOs. The 
review failed to acknowledge and deeply engage sport NGOs on their 
organisational priorities. Instead of adopting a participatory approach to 
consulting with sport, the review conducted a single round of submission-
based consultation to inform its report. The Graham committee then published 
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its report, rather than conducting a further feedback round to test its 
recommendations on the affected sport sector NGOs. The report ignored 
sport sector concerns about government contracting practice. Trenchant 
criticism of government contracting practice characterises the public discourse 
on how government funds NGOs in other sectors such as health and social 
services (Glensor, 2006; and Hanley, 2007). It seems likely that if asked, sport 
NGOs also might have sought changes to the contracting paradigm.  
The taskforce also proposed other benefits from sport participation 
such as: social cohesion; an enhanced sense of national identity and image; 
crime prevention; and economic benefits. The taskforce failed, however, to 
make explicit the connection between these public benefits and the actions of 
sport NGOs. The report also failed to test its assumptions that investment in 
recreation and sport through the sport NGOs, led to the committee‟s identified 
public benefits. The taskforce‟s assumptions reiterated those of previous 
reports In the absence of strong evidence to confirm the public benefits from 
government investment in sport, making such assumptions is risky. As the 
quantum of public funding grows, so the accountability for performance 
increases and without a sound evidence base, the policy decision to fund 
sport may not achieve any of the goals it intends.  
Some commentators argue that recent governments perceived the 
non-profit sector as a means to achieve state goals. Sam and Jackson (2004, 
218), consider that the taskforce‟s push toward more professionalisation and 
„business‟ models for New Zealand‟s sport delivery system reflected a wider 
economic rationalist model pervading the public sector. While it is correct that 
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subjecting the state sector to a long sequence of reforms and restructuring 
since the 1980s created great difficulties for state servants, the government 
funding agency (the commission then SPARC), subjected the sport sector to 
more central control from and a push (perhaps unwittingly) from funder 
towards uniformity. For instance, by 2001, the Hillary Commission and NZSF 
required sport NGOs to use funding templates which assumes a uniformity of 
planning systems and documents. Rather than the taskforce adopting an 
explicit rationalist ideology it seems more likely that it sought to emphasise 
and prioritise the achievement of government objectives. The taskforce 
ignored the question of sport sector goals as a critical priority to jointly 
achieving a national sport delivery system which better fitted government‟s 
purposes. 
This managerial tone inevitably favoured NGOs with more corporate 
and professional approaches to their operations (Sam & Jackson, 2004, 212; 
Shaw and Allen, 2006, 215). In other words, size and business models 
mattered. Strong business sector representation characterised the 1995 
Whineray review of elite sport funding and the 2001 Taskforce. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, both reviews produced reports with strong 
managerialist themes. 
The Graham report (Minister for Sport, Fitness and Leisure, 2001, 
116), proposed the following areas of additional government funding (now 
termed „investments‟): 
 recreation and sport facilities 
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 improved physical education and sport delivery in the state education 
system ($26.25 million) 
 sport NGOs ($18.655 million) 
 regional sport development initiatives primarily through the regional 
sport trust network ($16.25 million) 
 local sport organisations ($19.504 million) 
 elite sport ($39.5 million). 
These recommendations assumed that government investment in 
these areas led to three major benefits. First, an increase in sport 
participation; second, the emergence of a culture of physical activity for 
health; and third, sustainable health benefits underpinning each investment 
area. As noted earlier, the evidence for such links is weak and as such, 
government investment in sport particularly provides an uncertain means to 
achieve important public health outcomes.  
A review of the New Zealand public management system in 2001 
recommended that state sector agencies make outcomes more central to 
planning (State Services Commission, 2001a, 7-8). A further recommendation 
sought improvements to crown entity governance and better linkages between 
ministers, departments and crown entities. Government agencies responded 
to these recommendations with an impetus from the SSC to make use of 
intervention logic models of planning as a means of tackling outcomes. It was 
in this context that the Hillary Commission‟s accountability to parliament 
influenced its planning. The commission found itself caught in a difficult 
situation. On the one hand, the SSC sought more rigour to crown entities‟ 
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relationships with their ministers and departments (State Services 
Commission, 2000). On the other hand, the commission was more tightly 
focused on financial accountability and managing relationships with the sport 
sector. The commission typified the problems SSC sought to rectify. In 1996, 
the OAG advised the minister for internal affairs that the internal affairs select 
committee might ask the commission what assessment had been made of the 
commission‟s progress “in achieving the targets set out in the strategy 
documents” (Office of the Auditor-General, 1996). In the event, the internal 
affairs and local government select committee (1996) failed to interrogate the 
commission closely on this matter despite noting the audit office‟s advice to 
the commission “that it is important that the statement of intent includes all 
key activities of the commission and that achievements are reported at year 
end” (p. 246). 
Ministers increasingly demand evidence-based policy, a point 
emphasised in 2000 review of New Zealand‟s public management system, the 
Review of the Centre (State Services Commission, 2001, 7). The SSC and 
Treasury reiterated this pressure to underpin policy development with 
„evidence‟ in the aftermath of the Review of the Centre. The SSC promoted 
intervention logic-based planning throughout the state sector.23 It is unclear 
whether the taskforce thought about a logic model which connected the so-
called „investment areas‟ with public health or other social outcomes. The 
taskforce report lacks a clearly stated theory of change for society through 
sport participation. Governments often seek advice from review committees 
on how to attribute public expenditure with the framework of 
 
23
 State Services guidance notes on managing for outcomes can be found at 
http://www.ssc.govt.nz/display/document.asp?docid=4867  
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recommendations. The taskforce provided a general commentary on specific 
activities in each of the recommended areas for increased funding without 
specifying a cost. However, only the section on elite sport funding includes a 
headline budget of $39.5 million accompanied by a limited summary of how 
those funds should be spent. The report does not explain the connection 
between the levels of recommended funding and the social and economic 
benefit that might accrue from each level.  
The absence of a theory of change or logic model left gaps in the rationale 
which underpinned the taskforce‟s recommendations and thereby the case for 
government expenditure. The taskforce‟s recommendations lacked critical 
elements. First, government‟s involvement in the sport delivery system 
needed a set of clearly articulated long term goals or outcomes for sport and 
recreation. As noted elsewhere in this study, the sport system depends on 
voluntary sector action and the commitment of volunteers. Of the 
approximately 100 national sport NGOs in New Zealand, less than ten percent 
employ paid staff. The success of the taskforce‟s recommendations turned on 
the commitment of volunteers who were not engaged in the review. 
The report remained mute on short term goals for the specific areas of 
recommended investment as well as the necessary actions of sport NGOs to 
achieve such goals. Investing public money requires certainty about the use 
of that investment. By staying silent on these matters, the taskforce failed to 
make their assumptions clear about sport NGOs and their likely response to 
the report. Given that the review aimed to improve the whole sport delivery 
system, it seems that the taskforce assumed its solutions would find favour 
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with the sport sector. Sam (2005) states “taskforces inevitably have their own 
sets of rules regarding who should participate, how information is processed 
and what counts as a good outcome” (p. 83).  
Although the taskforce sought advice on its own account, the OTSP 
offered the taskforce a limited range of advice, in order to: 
provide the Taskforce with information which may be useful in 
considering the development of a vision for Sport, Fitness and Leisure 
to 2025, and identifies issues that may influence the realisation of this 
vision (Office for Tourism and Sport, 2000). 
Most importantly beyond recommended funding levels, the taskforce 
recommended that government establish a new body to take responsibility for 
“leadership and support of recreation and sport” (Minister for Sport, Fitness 
and Leisure, 2001, 85). This recommendation meant disestablishment of the 
Hillary Commission, repeal of its legislation and the passing of new legislation 
to set up a new body “a new crown entity….responsible for the leadership and 
support of recreation and sport” (Ibid. 12). The appointment of board 
members represented the critical difference between this new body and the 
existing Hillary Commission. The taskforce proposed that an “electoral 
college” comprising “five persons of the highest quality…who have an holistic 
view of recreation and sport in New Zealand” (Ibid. 67) be appointed for five 
years by the minister to provide advice on board membership. 
 The taskforce failed to explain how such an arrangement improved the 
existing situation, given that, in any case, ministers appoint crown entity board 
members. If the taskforce sought to generate a unified voice for sport, it failed 
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to explain how an electoral college achieved such a purpose. In effect, the 
proposal doubled the minister‟s involvement by appointing the electoral 
college and then appointing the new organisation‟s board on the 
recommendation of the electoral college. More importantly, the taskforce 
failed to explain why a new approach to government‟s involvement in sport 
required a new crown entity and accompanying legislation. Moreover, given 
the cost of and time required to draft and pass new legislation, the taskforce 
also failed to canvas the simpler option of directing the Hillary Commission to 
act in a different way and appoint a more appropriate board. Ministers have 
significant powers to direct crown entities and if the government agreed with 
the taskforce, Mallard had the opportunity to make all the changes he required 
by such direction. 
The taskforce made few comments on sport NGOs, despite 
acknowledging their “principal responsibility for the future good of their 
respective activities at all levels” (Ibid. 89). Rather than addressing the issue 
of whether or not any problems in the funding of the sport delivery system 
threatened the autonomy and sustainability of sport NGOs, the taskforce did 
make four observations about sport NGOs. First, that they be accountable for 
any public funding they received, secondly, funding should be based on 
“proven need” (Ibid. 89), thirdly, they needed to become self-managing and 
secure their own revenues in addition to any public funding and fourthly, they 
should be responsible for “success and failure in their fields” (Ibid. 89). 
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Behind these brief comments lay critical yet untested assumptions. 
Without evidence to the contrary, the taskforce presumed that sport NGOs 
were: 
 not demonstrating sufficient accountability either to the funder or to 
their members 
 receiving public funding based on identified needs 
 not self-managing or raising alternative funds 
 not accepting responsibility for success or failure. 
Although these issues fell within the taskforce‟s brief, the report failed to 
test the assumptions. Sport NGOs deliver sport services, they set rules, 
develop of coaches, referees and competition structures. An in depth analysis 
of the problems and challenges confronting sport NGOs under the existing 
system may have revealed quite different priorities for the taskforce to 
address. 
The government‟s response to the report took much of what the taskforce 
had concluded uncritically. Officials from affected government departments 
usually scrutinise such reports from independent government working groups 
prior to the report going to cabinet. In this case, the OTSP consulted with 
twelve government agencies (in particular the ministries of health and 
education) and the NZSF on the report‟s recommendations. On 19 March 
2001, minister Mallard informed cabinet that he agreed with the taskforce‟s 
analysis of problems in the sport sector.  
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The Taskforce has provided the government with the direction it can 
take to substantially improve the health and well-being of New 
Zealanders (Cabinet Office, 2001b). 
Importantly, he agreed that a „rejig‟ of existing arrangement would not 
achieve the “structural” changes recommended by the taskforce. In particular, 
Mallard argued that a new organisation was required to maintain existing 
private sector involvement and to ensure the proper management of public 
sector funding. In this case, Mallard supported the taskforce‟s view that a 
reconfigured Hilary Commission could not achieve the taskforce‟s goals 
despite the lack of supporting evidence. The Winning Way report in 1995 
came to a similar conclusion in arguing for an organisation separate from 
government to manage the public sector contribution to elite sport under 
contract. This separation, argued the Winning Way, avoided the risk of losing 
private sector funding from those corporates who lacked confidence in 
government departments. The Winning Way’s conclusion proved incorrect as 
the NZSF failed to attract significant new corporate funds.  
The Taskforce remained almost silent on the matter of corporate 
funding contributions, stating simply that, public sources of funding “must not 
preclude the corporate sector from also investing in recreation and sport 
initiatives” (Minister for Sport Fitness and Leisure, 2001, 116). The NZSF also 
noted this silence in its response to the taskforce report: 
The report is silent on the value of private sector involvement in sport, 
yet a survey in 1998 showed it to be in the vicinity of $90-$100 a year 
(excluding rugby) (New Zealand Sports Foundation, 2001). 
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The Graham taskforce thus moved the focus directly to a rationale for a 
comprehensive state-resourcing of the sport system. This represented a 
distinct shift from the wish to leverage greater engagement between 
government funding systems and the private sector promoted in the Winning 
Way report (Department of Internal Affairs, 1995, 10). 
Mallard now argued that a new organisation with new legislation was 
required in order to: 
a. develop and implement national policies and strategies for both 
recreation and sport 
b. to allocate funding for organisations and regional bodies in line with 
those agreed strategies 
c. to promote and advocate the importance of participation in physical 
activity 
d. to promote and disseminate research relevant to recreation and sport 
e. to provide advice to the Minister on issues relating to recreation and 
sport 
f. to work with schools, regional and local government and recreation and 
sport organisations to ensure the maintenance and development of the 
physical and organisational infrastructure needed for recreation and 
sport 
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g. to work with education agencies to promote greater involvement in 
recreation and sport through policy development, advocacy and 
support 
h. to provide advice and support for organisations working in recreation 
and sport and national, regional and local levels 
i. to facilitate co-ordination between national, regional and local 
recreation and sport organisations, and 
j. to represent the government‟s policy interests in recreation and sport 
internationally.” (Cabinet Office, 2001b). 
The Hillary Commission already had these powers under its existing 
legislation, a point Mallard omitted from his briefing of cabinet. In their scrutiny 
of the report, other potentially affected agencies passed little comment on its 
recommendations. In the lead up to cabinet‟s final consideration of the 
taskforce‟s proposals, all affected government agencies comment to their 
ministers on how their views of such new proposals. None of these 
government agencies spoke out in support of the proposal to establish the 
new agency despite broadly supporting its goals. The taskforce criticised the 
ministry of education which would not have welcomed such criticism, 
especially as Mallard was both minister if education and minister of sport. The 
report said, “The Taskforce has reservations about the willingness of the 
Ministry of Education to implement the changes that are essential if the 
objectives of this report are to be achieved.” (Minister for Sport Fitness and 
Leisure, 2001, 102). It seems probable that the ministry officials adjudged 
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arguing against their minister on matters concerning his other portfolio (sport) 
may have proved fruitless. 
The Treasury and SSC spoke out, however, concluded that establishing a 
new crown entity presented a range of financial performance and 
organisational risks as well as risks associated with changing from the Hillary 
Commission to a new organisation. These two central agencies argued that a 
final decision be delayed until the risks had been assessed (State Services 
Commission, 2001b). In particular, the SSC argued that existing legislation 
(the Sport, Fitness and Leisure Act) and the structure of the existing Hillary 
Commission were already available to give effect to the taskforce‟s 
recommendations (Ibid.). 
Despite Treasury‟s and SSC‟s caution, cabinet agreed to progress and 
proceeded to initiate the government process to establish Sport and 
Recreation New Zealand (later rebranded as SPARC) as a new agency with 
its own legislation. This required new legislation to be drafted and passed 
through the select committee stages and the third reading in the parliament 
within six to seven months, a very quick turnaround.  
Palmer and Palmer (2004, 189) note that the New Zealand parliament‟s 
legislation advisory committee guidelines recommend that legislative 
proposals need to ensure that they are the best means of achieving a policy 
objective. This includes the need to clearly define the policy, determine what 
alternatives exist to achieve the policy objective and to consult those agencies 
outside of government affected by the legislation. In the case of the new 
recreation and sport bill, cabinet approved the bill on 16 May 2001 as a 
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priority to be passed if possible in 2001. Of note in that cabinet decision was 
agreement that the new bill not include a clause limiting the new 
organisation‟s powers “to interfere with, or give directions to, the aims, objects 
or operations of any sport, fitness or leisure organisation” (Cabinet Office, 
2001b). The Sport, Fitness and Leisure Act contained this provision to 
establish a legislative boundary between the government agency and a 
funded NGO (Sport, Fitness and Leisure Act 1991, s.18). The Hillary 
Commission found this provision troublesome and had long sought its 
removal. Few officials or sport administrators recognised the potential impact 
of the change in these powers and an example of such and the impact 
appears later in this chapter. 
Critically, the taskforce overlooked the distinction between the need for a 
voice for sport independent from government and the role of a government 
agency. As a creature of government, a crown entity cannot speak 
independently of the state. The taskforce‟s recommendations for the functions 
of a new government agency include two short but telling items highlighting 
the taskforce‟s misunderstanding of a government agency‟s role: 
(2) To manage the expenditure of Crown and other public funds for the 
development of recreation and sport in New Zealand 
and 
(9) to ensure that recreation and sport has one major voice, a clear 
direction and unambiguous structures to serve its needs (Minister for Sport 
Fitness and Leisure, 2001, 68). 
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At no stage did the taskforce acquire a mandate from sport NGOs to 
recommend that a government agency speak on behalf of the sport sector.  
The taskforce report provides no analysis of the existing 1987 Act and why 
new legislation overcame any weaknesses or omission in that legislation. 
Moreover, nowhere in any taskforce papers or subsequent government 
papers is evidence presented of a rigorous cost-benefit analysis of the 
taskforce‟s options for change. It is unclear whether the taskforce‟s concerns 
about the existing Hillary Commission arrangements rested on issues of style, 
direction, duties and/ or powers. A relatively simple solution to such issues lay 
in the use of an amendment to the existing Act. Government took this 
approach in 1992, when the focus and powers of the Hillary Commission 
changed from those provided under the 1987 recreation and sport legislation 
to new arrangements under the Sport, Fitness and Leisure Amendment Act 
1992. In that instance, the broad thrust of the 1987 Act remained the same 
with merely a name change and amendments recognising the evolved and 
wider scope of the commission‟s extant practice. Sport NGOs also remained 
outside this process, no doubt puzzled by the commitment of effort to a 
parliamentary process to change the Hillary Commission‟s funding scope. 
The Taskforce‟s seemingly ad hoc „shopping list‟ of recommendations for a 
wide range of government departments to become engaged in assisting sport 
lacked a rigorous policy framework (Ibid. 104-109). While individual 
government agencies may indeed have had the potential to have a significant 
impact on many aspects of the New Zealand‟s overall sport delivery system, 
each agency would need to have determined their own policy rationale for 
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such actions. The absence of a cabinet mandate for whole-of-government 
policies that directed or compelled diverse government agencies to act on 
behalf of another portfolio ie sport, made the co-operation of these other 
agencies unlikely. 
It is too early to assess the long term impact of SPARC and the results of 
following the Graham report‟s recommendations that government involvement 
in sport focus on achieving public health outcomes. To date, however, four 
examples of the approach to supporting the sport sector taken by SPARC 
provide evidence that the post review era continues the lack meaningfully 
engage the sport sector in critical areas and a strong sense of „top down‟ 
relationship management with the sport sector. 
First, in 2002, SPARC unilaterally cut the longstanding $5 million local 
government fund which enable local committees to support local sport 
activities based on local priorities. Local authorities reacted swiftly, 
complaining to the minister who insisted that SPARC reverse its decision. 
This level of direction from a minister to a crown entity is unusual and 
provided an early signal about the extent of SPARC‟s approach to 
consultation. Many local authority managers and councillors remained 
suspicious of SPARC for some years thereafter. 
Second, SPARC signals its strategic goals to government through a 
statement of corporate intent (SOI) tabled annually in parliament. Like most 
government agencies, SPARC reports its assessment of risks within the 
portfolio beyond the normal risk management associated with organisations 
eg fire, data loss and management succession planning. The 2006-2009 
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statement of intent elaborates on SPARC‟s risk framework. SPARC notes the 
need to manage “risks to its brands, in particular SPARC, Push Play and the 
New Zealand Academy of Sport” (Sport and Recreation New Zealand, 2006b, 
26). The balance of the risk framework addresses management issues such 
as insurance and indemnity and internal audit. The SOI ignores risks 
associated with the stability and sustainability of the sport NGOs system and 
the possibility of the sport sector unwillingness to collaborate with SPARC. 
The SPARC SOI makes no reference to a partnership or collaborative 
relationship with the sport NGO network as a whole. As noted in the final 
chapter of this study, a commitment to NGO engagement characterises the 
work and strategic planning of government agencies which depend of NGOs 
for the achievement of portfolio outcomes. The SOI fails to acknowledge the 
need to engage systematically with NGO stakeholders. It does make explicit, 
however, SPARC‟s desire to contribute to greater social cohesion “by 
supporting the development of the sport and physical recreation sector and by 
building the sector‟s capacity to deliver quality sport and recreation 
experiences to more New Zealanders” (Ibid. 14). The SOI is mute on 
SPARC‟s intent to seek out the views of sport NGOs in meeting SPARC‟s 
own goals especially as those NGOs took no part in setting those priorities. 
Clearly, government planning and reporting processes required SPARC to set 
appropriate strategic goals to justify the use of public resources. However, 
given the critical role of sport NGOs in achieving SPARC‟s goals, sport NGOs 
may feel excluded from SPARC‟s high level planning and decision-making 
which inevitably requires their co-operation. Five years earlier, the Community 
 141 
and Voluntary Sector Working Party (Ministry of Social Policy, 2001) summed 
up similar concerns from across the whole spectrum of the NGO sector: 
Many community people, dedicated and passionate about their work, 
expressed concern that their expertise and knowledge, gained from 
hands-on experience, have consistently been ignored in the critical policy 
processes at the heart of government (p. 80). 
A third example, relates to SPARC‟s commitment to engaging with sport 
NGOs as a collective and the extent of the sector‟s confidence in the 
government funder. It took SPARC until 2007, five years from its 
establishment, to convene a first meeting of sport chief executives to discuss 
the future of sport in New Zealand. Comments from participants at that event 
reflected chief executives‟ concern about a top down process and lack of any 
ongoing participatory process (regional sport organisation chief executive, 
personal communication, May 1, 2007). Subsequently, SPARC promoted a 
first „sport leaders‟ conference in 2008 attracting over 250 registrations. 
However, of the 104 sport NGOs funded by SPARC, less than 15 sport chief 
executives and fewer sport national sport organisation board chairs 
attended.24 Only around 50 participants attended the final session of the 
conference which presented SPARC‟s perspective on a new sport and 
recreation “pathway” for New Zealand.  
Privately, some sport administrators commented on the lack of meaningful 
engagement with SPARC and the onerous nature of funding contracts. Some 
also commented on the need for an organisation, independent of SPARC 
 
24
 Analysis of the SPARC, 2008 „Leaders in Sport‟ conference attendees taken from the list of 
registrations. 
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funding to deliver a „voice for sport‟ (national sport organisation chief 
executive, personal communication, April 3, 2008). The record of poor 
engagement with the sector underscores the importance of a policy dialogue 
with sport that recognises the independence of sport NGOs and the 
interdependence of both government and the sector. Without a strong and 
vibrant sport sector, government‟s goals for sport are unachievable. The 
power of holding the purse-strings does not mandate government to demand 
NGOs to act on behalf of government without agreement to collaborate on a 
shared purpose. 
A final example illustrates the extent of SPARC‟s new powers, mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, to involve itself directly in the affairs of sport 
organisation. In May 2008, concerns about the financial state of the New 
Zealand rugby league led SPARC to demand a review of the sport. Publicity 
surrounding SPARC‟s demands brought its powers into sharp relief for sport 
administrators (Kilgallon, 2008): 
Highly respected Sparc chairman, John Wells, wrote to the sport on 
Thursday saying Sparc had no confidence in the NZRL‟s operations, 
demanding it be allowed to conduct a full inquiry and that the league be 
bound to accept its findings…….The letter requests a full review of board 
governance, the sport‟s constitution, voting rights, the relationship between 
the league and its members, it management, policy development, 
grassroots structure, planning communication, stakeholder relations and 
financial sustainability and management. Sparc wants the NZRL to accept 
every finding. (p. A1) 
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SPARC had a responsibility to ensure the wise use of government funding. By 
definition, however, NGOs are independent of government and not subject to 
instruction beyond what is lawful. In this case, although not financially 
independent of government, the sport NGO‟s own accountabilities for 
governance and management did not extend to SPARC. Yet again, no „voice 
for sport‟ provided commentary ensuring that government observed an 
appropriate boundary between itself and the NGO. This case also implied that 
the rugby league acted as the agents of a government funder with little 
discretion or bargaining power. Some sport administrators may now be 
concerned about the extent to which this sort of action threatens the 
independence of the sport sector in an NGO context. The NGO system is 
independent of government, yet their success often requires an 
interdependence especially where government achieves its goals through 
supporting them. In other public policy areas characterised by collaboration 
between the state and NGOs (e.g., health and social services), an overly 
demanding state sector puts the voluntary sector at risk. In the sport sector, 
that risk is real yet collaboration seems more difficult to achieve. 
In the absence of a commitment to engagement and NGO participation in 
planning the sport system, the possibility of SPARC meeting its strategic 
goals seems unlikely. As a state sector agency, a consultative and 
collaborative approach with the sport sector may prove more fruitful for both 
parties.  
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Chapter Seven - The Future for Sport NGO 
Participation in Sport Policy Development 
This final chapter draws conclusions from the chronology of government 
involvement in New Zealand sport and its implications for future policy work. 
The chapter focuses particularly on the need for meaningful engagement 
between the sport sector and government in order to provide the basis for a 
national sport policy built on collaboration between the two.  
This study opens with a quote from Runciman (2003) that ends “Caution 
should be exercised when partnering with the state” (p. 12). Little evidence 
exists of substantive partnership or collaborative practice between 
government and the New Zealand‟s sport sector since 1937. In the early 
years of the physical welfare approach, neither government nor the sport 
sector sought common ground and few incentives existed for engagement. 
Once government established a recreation and sport agency in 1973, the 
discourse between government and the sector grew slowly until the advent of 
Lotto and the availability of substantial community purposes funds. Sport 
NGOs looked to the government for increased support and from the late 
1980s government increasingly sought to account for the use of funds and to 
provide leadership to the sector using the leverage of funding. 
In effect, the Hillary Commission and SPARC became gatekeepers. While 
at first, it seemed only to control the funding supply, the accompanying 
reporting and accountability requirements began to reshape the sector as 
NGOs adapted themselves to appear responsive to the funder. 
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Commentators on NGO funding by the state characterise this phenomenon as 
„mission drift‟. Scott (2003) puts this succinctly: 
As organizations scramble to qualify for narrowly prescribed program 
funding or to win government contracts, some are being pulled away from 
their primary mission, which is their long-term purpose and the source of 
their credibility within the community. (p. 14) 
In retrospect, the Hillary Commission and SPARC seemed oblivious to the 
phenomenon and its accompanying risks. In meetings with sport NGOs 
individually and collectively, both organisations spoke to the sector of working 
together and partnership. In its most recent SOI, SPARC (2007) states 
unambiguously: 
We partner with national sport and recreation organisations, regional 
sports trusts, local authorities and many other organisations that have the 
ability to get people and programmes moving in their areas……..We have 
mad challenging decisions about shifting from what was a predominantly 
an annual grants approach to funding to an investment-focused approach. 
This introduced contestability, multi-year outcomes based contracts, 
emphasis on partnerships with regional sports trusts and increased 
monitoring and evaluation of outcomes……..and have built and valued 
robust partnerships with key partners. (p. 3) 
The concepts of investment, contestability and monitoring mark a clear 
trend towards a top down approach to funding entirely consistent with the 
traditional government agency role as „keeper of the system‟. New Zealand 
sport administrators may consider this approach as merely a continuation of 
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previous funder regimes. In contemporary settings governments now seek 
consensus and a sense of shared purpose across the political, policy and 
administrative areas of governance. In this context, Althaus, Bridgman & 
Davis (2007, 26) comment on government leadership in policy arenas: 
A key leadership task is to bring the three domains into alignment, so all 
aspect of government work in concert towards shared goals, taking into 
account the role of players external to government such as the media and 
the third sector and community more generally. (p. 26) 
Government needs the sport NGO system to deliver sport. In that context 
alone, engaging the sector in developing policy, strategy and prioritisation of 
resources seems unavoidably yet it has not occurred. To obtain a clear and 
thoughtful response from the sport sector on making the best use of many 
millions of dollars in public funding requires meaningful engagement between 
government (SPARC) and the sport sector. Throughout the chronology, 
neither ministers, nor government sport agencies nor review committees 
systematically sought or facilitated a voice for sport. With 500,000 sport 
volunteers making a significant contribution to society the objective of a 
participatory approach will be a prerequisite to a partnership approach.  
In this early part of the 21st century, the New Zealand sport sector remains 
predominantly a club or association-based NGO system. Despite the 
emergence of large corporate organisations running the major sporting codes 
at national level eg rugby, netball and cricket, the vast majority of sport 
organisations comprise a complex mix ranging from small clubs run entirely 
by volunteers to national federations underpinned by local volunteers. 
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SPARC‟s own conclusions that the New Zealand sport system depends on 
around 500,000 volunteers represents around 45% of all volunteers across 
the whole non-profit sector (Sport and Recreation New Zealand, 2007a, 2). 
Many other parts of the New Zealand non-profit sector such as social 
services and health engage vigorously with their government agencies and 
relevant ministers. Those same agencies understand the need for credible 
engagement and the importance of hearing from a co-ordinated NGO voice 
on policy development issues and service delivery planning. None of these 
government agencies purport to speak on behalf of their NGO stakeholders. 
SPARC seems oblivious to this trend and provides no direct support to ensure 
a voice for sport. Despite several attempts since 1937 to build a co-ordinated 
and sustainable voice for sport, the sport sector has experienced little 
success. Various federations or council for sport fell away until the 1980s 
when the New Zealand Assembly for Sport emerged. But in the absence of 
government funding support, the assembly fell into decline with neither the 
Hillary Commission nor SPARC deeming such a voice to be worthwhile. This 
lack of interest in the sport sector‟s voice flies in the face of trends across 
government agencies. Current initiatives range from the long-standing and 
highly developed strategic engagement framework between international 
NGOs and New Zealand Agency for International Aid to the six monthly health 
and disability NGO forum run by the ministry of health to subject specific NGO 
reference groups run by the ministry of social development.25 26These and 
 
25
 NZAID‟s strategic policy framework for relations between NZAID and New Zealand NGOs 
can be found at http://www.nzaid.govt.nz/library/docs/nzaid-strategic-policy-framework.pdf  
26
 Information on the ministry of health, health and disability NGO forum can be found at 
http://www.moh.govt.nz/ngo  
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other engagement mechanisms are all government funded and provide critical 
input to those government agencies. 
While many of these engagement mechanisms vary in quality and scope, 
they remain responsive to the voice of the NGO sector in question. The issues 
they raise are cross-cutting and important to most NGOs. All sectors express 
deep concern about the impact of government‟s contracting culture, the 
weakness in participatory processes linked to public policy and the 
insensitivity of government to sector capacity and capability needs despite 
government calling on the sector to work in partnership or collaboration. 
The New Zealand sport lobby remains mute, however, with only the NZOC 
providing a co-ordinated voice around Olympic and Commonwealth Games. 
The Central Council of Physical Recreation acts as an independent voice to 
the United Kingdom government on behalf of British sport NGOs. Established 
in 1976, the national body for sport in Australia, the Confederation of 
Australian Sport (CAS), advances the interests of the Australian sport and 
gives the industry a united voice in discussions and negotiations with 
government and other stakeholders. CAS‟s members include most of 
Australia‟s national sport NGOs representing over seven million members. 
Sport NGOs remained outside the government ambit from 1937 to 1973 
with government considering sport to be a matter of private choice and 
generally beyond the ambit of public policy. The establishment of a 
government ministry for recreation and sport in 1973 and subsequent crown 
entities for sport brought a commitment of taxpayer funds and a general 
understanding by ministers that government does indeed have an interest in 
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sport participation and elite sport success. A policy framework for such 
interest remains elusive. To date, the government funders‟ decision-making 
about priorities for the sport sector “presumes a hierarchical government 
bureaucracy interacting with society to repetitively and uniformly carry out 
government objectives” (Althaus, Bridgman & Davis, 2007, 91). This approach 
is reminiscent of previous top-town approaches by government agencies in 
their dealings with the wider NGO sector. Contemporary governments now 
prioritise networks and emphasise relationships in order to achieve policy 
goals. In regard to such relationships, Althaus, Bridgman and Davis (2007) 
also note: 
Parties usually have some form of incentive to communicate and 
participate and the mutual interaction and joint exchange that occurs, 
impels policy making. (p. 91) 
The sport NGO networks provide government with an opportunity to draw 
on vast deposits of information and experience, much of it from volunteers. 
Pressures of accountability for the use of public resources bear down on 
government agency views of the world. Today, SPARC manages over $70 
million of public funds for sport along with around $30 million of profits from 
Lotto, money also sourced from the public. Never in New Zealand history, has 
so much public funding been available to sport NGOs. The pressures of public 
sector accountability for such large sums of money currently subsume any 
ideas of collaboration or partnership between government and the sport 
sector. One year funding arrangements between SPARC and sport NGOs 
prevail. Despite this, sport development remains a long term process. Short 
term funding seems at odds with any focus on long term development.  
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This study points to a range of lessons for the government‟s sport funder is 
remains committed to concepts of partnership. First, government needs to 
make greater use of participatory processes to engage the sport sector in a 
long term process. The sport sector is, in effect, a third party deliver of sport in 
return for government funding. Without deep and respectful engagement, 
sport NGOs will have little incentive to work in partnership. Instead they will 
merely compete with other for funds and be distracted from purpose through 
that competition. 
Sustainable partnerships require both parties to feel a sense of ownership. 
When government holds the purse strings it holds most of the power. Yet 
without the NGOs, government has no system to fund. Therefore government 
needs to initiate a change in attitude from gatekeeper to facilitator. This will 
require extensive consultation and a sense of government commitment to 
collaboration. 
Second, government must be seen to be going about things in a different 
way. Building trust and gaining credibility with the sport sector will take time. 
In the current era, SPARC‟s base corporate costs exceed $12.5 million with 
additional salary costs associated with programmes adding to that total (Sport 
and Recreation New Zealand, 2007b, 23-24). Sport NGO administrators may 
perceive SPARC as „taking over‟ the sector with funds intended for distribution 
to the sector. SPARC seems to have little sense of the sector‟s expectations 
and that it needs to build trust and credibility with sport NGOs, SPARC‟s 
actions and decision impact on the lives of not just paid sport administrators 
but also on the thousands of volunteers. Sport volunteers did not „sign up‟ to 
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be the targets of “investment”, “contestability” or “monitoring”. Indeed, many 
NGOs may not wish to be a partner of the government funder, yet they have a 
right to access public and lottery funds allocated to sport. A collaborative 
environment between SPARC and its sport stakeholders requires a sport 
sector well-informed about government policy processes and an 
understanding of government‟s goals for sport expressed through SPARC‟s 
funding strategies. 
Third, partnerships fail when poorly managed or goals are misaligned. If 
the change in society SPARC aims to achieve centres around improved public 
health, then SPARC and the sport NGOs require a shared sense of purpose 
and shared sense of what to do. On the subject of government collaborating 
with NGOs, Gidron (as cited by Dollery and Wallis, 2003) observes “the extent 
of experimentation with collaborative models of service provision are striking” 
(p. 118). This provides some clues to where the Hillary Commission and 
SPARC may have erred in their relationship management with the sport 
NGOs. As discussed earlier in this study, government contracting and a focus 
on accountability and monitoring grew from government‟s need for services 
delivered outside the state sector. Service delivery NGOs are found mostly in 
the social service and health sector. NGOs in the sport and arts sectors do 
not deliver services in the orthodox sense. Tennant, O‟Brien & Sanders (2008, 
35) refer to the latter NGOs as „expressive-type‟ as opposed to „service-type‟.  
Within this typology, sport NGOs deliver benefits mostly to members as 
opposed to services to others or non-members. If government‟s involvement 
in sport seeks to achieve public policy goals, that involvement requires a 
commitment to enjoining NGO members to share in those goals. 
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While the definition of a sport NGO is of academic interest, sport 
administrators understand the volunteer dimension of such a definition. That 
volunteer base is common to over 90% of all New Zealand sport NGOs. The 
service delivery paradigm may be clear to the funder but alien and 
inappropriate for the sport sector. A commitment to partnership by SPARC will 
take more than words in an SOI. A failure to focus unambiguously on each 
partner‟s expected outcomes lead to crossed expectations and strained 
relationships. This characterises the relationship between New Zealand sport 
and government mitigating against any potential for partnership. 
The absence of a formal government policy driven by the wishes of 
ministers has reduced dramatically the incentive on the government sport 
agencies to engage meaningfully with the sector. Public policy implies a 
change in behaviour of a particular part of society to achieve a goal of 
government. But when government needs someone other than itself to 
implement policy, a relationship with that party based on principles and 
shared reason is required in order for both to share in that policy‟s purpose. In 
the case of New Zealand sport, such a shared relationship remains 
undiscovered. Rasmussen, Malloy & Agarwal (2003) summarise the 
challenge aptly when discussing the implementation of and accountability for 
public policy: 
The best solutions become ones requiring governments to enter 
relationships that create a new cooperative context for those who 
participate in the implementation process. (p. 127) 
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Appendix A - New Zealand Ministers of Sport  
 
Ministers for Recreation and Sport from 1973 to the present day include: 
 Hon Joe Walding (Labour) 1972-1975 
 Hon Allan Highet (National) 1975 - 1978 
 Hon Allan Highet (National) 1978 - 1981 
 Hon Allan Highet (National) 1981 - 1984 
 Hon Mike Moore (Labour) 1984 - 1987 
 Hon Peter Tapsell (Labour) 1987 - 1990 
 Hon John Banks (National) 1990 - 1993 
 Hon John Banks (National) 1993 - 1996 
 Hon Murray McCully (National-New Zealand First coalition) 1996 - 1999 
 Hon Trevor Mallard (Labour-Progressive coalition) 1999 - 2002 
 Hon Trevor Mallard (Labour-Progressive coalition) 2002 - 2005 
 Hon Trevor Mallard (Labour-Progressive-United coalition) 2005 - 2007 
 Hon Clayton Cosgrove (Labour-Progressive-United coalition) 2007 - 2008. 
 
 172 
Appendix B - The New Zealand Council for Recreation 
and Sport 
 
Membership of the first New Zealand Council for Recreation and Sport in 
1973: 
 Des Sullivan (Chair), Senior Magistrate, Wellington 
 John Buckingham, Auckland 
 Lance Cross, Wellington, chair, New Zealand OIympic and 
Commonwealth Games Association 
 Murray Halberg, Auckland, former Olympic medallist 
 Sir Edmund Hillary, Auckland, first person to climb Mount Everest 
 Dr Norrie Jefferson, Invercargill, sports medicine specialist 
 Beverley Morris, University Lecturer, Wellington 
 Bob Stothart, Wellington educationist and historian 
 Peter Tapsell, Rotorua, Māori and medical practitioner 
 Val Young, Christchurch, Olympic athlete 
 Sir Patrick O‟Dea, Secretary for Recreation and Sport and Secretary for 
Internal Affairs 
Membership of the New Zealand Council for Recreation and Sport by the end 
of 1975: 
 Des Sullivan (Chair), Senior Magistrate, Wellington 
 John Buckingham, Auckland, Federation of Sport 
 Lance Cross, chair, New Zealand OIympic and Commonwealth Games 
Association 
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 Lyn Scott, Oamaru 
 Colin Kay, Auckland, local government councillor 
 Roy Walker, Dunedin 
 Nathan Paewai, Kaikohe, Māori and general practitioner 
 Bob Stothart, Wellington educationist and historian 
 Di Beard; Te Aroha 
 Val Young; Christchurch, Olympic athlete 
 Sir Patrick O‟Dea; Secretary for Recreation and Sport and Secretary for 
Internal Affairs 
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Appendix C - The 2000 Taskforce 
 
Taskforce membership comprised: 
 John Hart (Fletcher Challenge and former All Black Coach) 
 Jane Hunter (Hunters Wines) 
 Paul Collins (Brierley Investments). 
Former All Black Captain, David Kirk, then a senior advisor in the Department 
of Prime Minister and Cabinet, serviced the Taskforce 
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Appendix D - The Prime Minister’s Committee to 
Review High Performance Sport 
Members of the review committee: 
 Wilson Whineray (Chair), Chair of the Hillary Commission 
 John Hart (Deputy Chair), Chair of the New Zealand 2000 Taskforce 
 Sir David Beattie, President of the New Zealand Olympic Games 
Association 
 Paul Collins, Chair of the New Zealand Sports Foundation 
 Susie Simcock, Vice President of the World Squash Association 
 Roger Blakeley, Secretary for Internal Affairs 
 Bronwyn Somerville, Senior Advisor, Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet 
 Sharon van Gulik, Private Secretary to the Minister of Sport, Fitness and 
Leisure 
 David Pennington, Acting Manager, Government Services, the Treasury 
Hugh Lawrence, Senior Policy Analyst, Sport, Fitness and Leisure, 
Department of Internal Affairs serviced the review committee. 
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Appendix E - The Restructured New Zealand Sports 
Foundation 
The eleven new board members were: 
 from the new NZSF electoral college: 
o Paul Collins 
o Sir John Anderson,  
o John Hart 
o Mike Robson 
o James Willis 
o Lois Muir. 
(All former members of the previous NZSF board and, with the exception of 
Muir, significant figures in the business world) 
 From the Hillary Commission: 
o Brian Lochore (new Hillary Commission chair) 
o David Howman (sports lawyer) 
o Roger Blakeley (DIA chief executive). 
 From the NZOCGA: 
o Tim Castle (president) 
o Peter Miskimmin (athletes‟ commission chair). 
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Appendix F – The Sport, Fitness and Leisure 
Ministerial Taskforce 
Members of the Sport, Fitness and Leisure, Ministerial Taskforce 
 
 John Graham, Chair (Auckland) educationist and former All Black 
manager 
 David Collins (Wellington) barrister 
 Susan Devoy (Tauranga) sport administrator and former world squash 
champion 
 Janet MacKay (Wellington) chief executive New Zealand Women‟s Golf 
 Farah Palmer captain of the New Zealand women‟s rugby team 
 Mark Simmonds (Wellington) cardiologist 
 Glenn Turner (Dunedin) sport administrator and member of the 1984 
Ministerial Inquiry into Recreation and Sport. 
 
